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INTRODUCTION
Few procedural issues have commanded more attention from the
Supreme Court in recent years than standing.1 The question of who is a
proper party to bring a particular claim has arisen in a variety of con-
texts, but the Court has been especially active in addressing standing
problems in cases concerning allegations of housing discrimination. The
recent decision of Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood2 marked the
fifth time in the past decade that the justices have decided a fair housing
case on standing grounds.3
The degree of the Court's activity in this field is somewhat surprising
in view of how recent a development fair housing law is. 4 One result of this
activity is that Supreme Court pronouncements on the subject of housing
discrimination have largely been delivered in opinions that focus on
standing issues. In the area of exclusionary zoning, for example, the
Court's first decision dealt entirely with standing matters,5 and its second
effort reached the substantive question only after the plaintiffs' standing to
sue was thoroughly considered.6 In addition, the Court has already
decided two standing cases under the Fair Housing Act (Title VIII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1968) 7 even though it has yet to review a Title VIII case
on the merits.8 Thus, important questions concerning what constitutes
housing discrimination and what injuries are brought about when it occurs
have more often than not been considered indirectly in the course of the
Court's attempts to define who has standing to invoke the constitutional
and statutory guarantees of equal housing opportunity.
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's efforts to clarify the subject-
or perhaps because of them-standing problems in fair housing cases seem
to have grown out of all proportion to their proper place in this field.
Although only one of the Supreme Court's five decisions actually denied
standing to plaintiffs, the very fact that the Court has shown such concern
I. See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study
Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976); United
States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S.
208 (1974); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974); United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973);
Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). See also
cases cited in note 3 infra.
2. 441 U.S. 91 (1979).
3. Those five cases are Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979); Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490 (1975); Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972); Sullivan v. Little Hunting
Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
4. See note 20 and accompanying text infra.
5. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
6. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1976). See Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91
(1979); Traflicante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
8. Besides these two standing decisions, the Supreme Court has decided only one other Title VIII
case. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1972). That case held that a defendant was entitled to ajury
trial in a fair housing suit seeking damages.
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with who may properly bring housing discrimination claims has
encouraged defendants to raise the standing question in scores of other
cases. Thus, except in the simplest of cases in which a minority plaintiff
clearly has standing because he is suing a defendant who has discriminated
against him directly, fair housing litigation often requires a trial judge to
specifically consider whether the plaintiff has standing.
The matter has been made more difficult by the Supreme Court's
failure thus far to provide any real analysis of what "injury" means in a fair
housing case or of how an injury is caused. The individual decisions, of
course, do resolve some issues, but they have invariably led to even more
questions. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc.,9 for example, establishes
that a white homeowner is entitled to sue his neighborhood association ifit
interferes with his efforts to rent his house to a black tenant. The opinion
does not, however, make clear whether the homeowner has standing
because his own rights have been violated or because he is permitted to
assert the rights of his prospective tenant. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co.10 and Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood" hold that
tenants in a large apartment complex and residents in a neighborhood
have standing to challenge discriminatory practices that affect the racial
patterns of their communities. Questions remain, however, about how far
these decisions may be extended beyond their own facts and what other
types of plaintiffs will be permitted to assert this "right to live in an
integrated community." Perhaps the clearest guidance from the Supreme
Court has come in the area of exclusionary zoning. In this area, Warth v.
Seldin12 and Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Development Corp.13 establish that standing principles will generally
require that a specific housing development first be blocked by the
defendants. Few beyond the Court, however, seem to understand why a
particular zoning decision is more subject to attack than a general
exclusionary scheme.14 The Court, moreover, still has not decided whether
the developer of a specific project-clearly the most effective opponent of
any adverse zoning decision-has standing to challenge that decision."
Some of the difficulties concerning the subject of standing in fair
housing cases simply reflect the overall complexity and confusion of
9. 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
10. 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
11. 441 U.S. 91 (1979).
12. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
13. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
14. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW94-97(1978). ProfessorTribedescribes
the result in Warth as "aberrational in the extreme." Id. at 96; Sager, Insular Majorities Unabated:
Warth v. Seldin andCity ofEastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 91 HARV. L. REV. 1373, 1382-88
(1978).
15. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 263-64
(1977).
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standing law generally as it has developed in recent years.' 6 Housing
discrimination cases have presented all the difficult questions that the
standing doctrine entails: who is injured by an unlawful practice and how
that injury is caused; who can sue to vindicate the rights of third parties;
whether state and federal courts are subject to the same standing
requirements when federal rights are asserted; and how the constitutional,
prudential, and statutory concepts of standing relate to one another. The
most basic of these questions for standing purposes-who is injured by an
act of housing discrimination-is made more difficult since housing
discrimination itself is not an easy concept to define. It covers a variety of
practices: simple refusals to deal on the basis of race; exclusionary zon-
ing; discriminatory tenant and site selection policies by public housing
authorities; racial steering; blockbusting; and redlining. t7 Because most
forms of housing discrimination were not declared unlawful until 1968,18
judicial experience with these cases is still relatively limited. It is not.
surprising, therefore, that standing law, as it has been applied in suits
alleging discriminatory housing practices, has not always developed in a
consistent or sensible manner.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's determination to emphasize
standing issues in many of its early fair housing opinions means that these
issues will be the focus of substantial litigation in the coming years.
Therefore, it is essential that the problems in this area be understood and
that some systematic and rational approach to their resolution be
developed.
16. "Standing has been called one of 'the most amorphous [concepts] in the entire domain of
public law.'" Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968), quoting Hearings on S. 2097 before the
Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 465,
498 n.6 (1966) (statement of Professor Paul A. Freund). The Supreme Court's numerous efforts to
clarify the subject in the past decade (see, e.g., cases cited in notes 1, 3 supra) have been notably
unsuccessful. The "intellectual confusion" created by the Court's recent decisions was acknowledged
by Justices Brennan and Marshall in Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 66 n.13
(1976) (Brennan, J., concurring). See also Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397
U.S. 150, 151 (1970), in which Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, stated: "Generalizations about
standing to sue are largely worthless as such." The lower courts and commentators have also been
unusually outspoken in their criticism of the Supreme Court's performance. See, e.g., Scanwell
Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 861 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ("The law of standing as developed by
the Supreme Court has become an area of incredible complexity. Much that the Court has written
appears to have been designed to supply retrospective satisfaction rather than future guidance.");
Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A Functional Analysis, 86 HARV. L. REV. 645, 645-46 & n. 1
(1973); K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES 170 (Supp. 1978) ("The whole law of
standing is so confused and cluttered and yet so often decisive of litigation that it is vital to parties that
the lower courts and practitioners especially need Supreme Court guidance. The two 1976 decisions
[Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976)], taken together, subtract from the needed guidance.").
17. The focus of this article is racial discrimination, but it is worth noting that the Fair Housing
Act also prohibits discrimination on the basis of color, religion, sex, and national origin. See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 3604-3606 (1976). Bills currently pending in Congress would amend Title VIII to include
discrimination on the basis of physical and mental handicaps. See H.R. 2540, S. 506, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1979). The principles discussed in this article presumably would apply to these other forms of
unlawful housing discrimination.
18. See note 20 and accompanying text infra.
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This article is intended to be a contribution to that effort. The heart of
the article is a detailed review of the five standing opinions produced thus
far by the Supreme Court in fair housing cases. This discussion leads to a
number of conclusions about the current state of the law and about the
significant problems that remain to be solved. The types of claims and the
types of claimants that may occur in housing discrimination suits are
categorized in order to develop an overall approach to standing issues in
this field. The basic question that underlies the entire article is whether a
general rule-such as one that would recognize standing in any plaintiff
who is injured in any way as a result of a fair housing violation-can be an
appropriate and meaningful guide for deciding specific cases in this field or
whether, since "[g]eneralizations about standing to sue are largely
worthless as such,"19 each individual case or type of case must be governed
by its own rules.
I. THE SUPREME COURT AND STANDING IN FAIR HOUSING CASES
A. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc.
The modern era of fair housing law began in 1968, when the Fair
Housing Act was passed by Congress and when the Supreme Court
in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1866
(42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982) to prohibit private housing discrimination.20
Prior to these events, there had been a few cases in which the Court had
struck down instances of governmental discriminaton in housing pursuant
to the equal protection clause2 or section 1982,22 and occasionally these
cases presented standing issues. 23 The year 1968, however, marks the
beginning of continuous, active fair housing litigation.24
In 1969, the Court reaffirmed Jones in Sullivan v. Little Hunting
Park, Inc. 25 Sullivan held that damages were available in a private housing
discrimination suit under § 1982. It also dealt with some procedural issues,
including the standing of a white homeowner to sue those who had
prevented him from renting his home to a black tenant.
19. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151 (1970).
20. 392 U.S. 409 (1968). 42 U.S.C. § 1982 provides: "All citizens of the United States shall have
the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase,
lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property."
21. E.g., Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948);
Buchanon v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
22. E.g., Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948).
23. E.g., Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Buchanon v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
24. Another significant event of 1968 that led to a substantial number of housing discrimination
suits was the passage of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-448,82 Stat. 476
(1968), amending the National Housing Act of 1934, 12 U.S.C. § 1715z (1976). Proposals for low and
moderate income housing projects subsidized under this law were often blocked by local municipalities
through zoning and other land use restrictions, which prompted a series of "exclusionary zoning" suits
after 1968. See notes 125, 126, and accompanying text infra.
25. 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
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Little Hunting Park, Inc., operated a community park and recreation
facilities for the benefit of residents in an area of Fairfax County, Virginia.
Sullivan owned two houses in the area, each with a membership share in
the park corporation. He lived in one of these homes and leased the other
to T.R. Freeman, Jr., assigning his membership share to Freeman. The
Park's board refused to approve the assignment "because Freeman was a
Negro. 26 When Sullivan protested, he was expelled from the organization
and given cash for his two shares.
Sullivan and Freeman sued the corporation and its board in state
court for violations of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. The Virginia courts
denied relief, but the Supreme Court reversed, holding that under the
circumstances of the case, section 1982 provided each of the plaintiffs with
a claim for damages.
1. Standing of the Black Homeseeker
The Court in Sullivan had little trouble concluding that the
defendants' actions violated Freeman's "right . .. to lease . . . real and
personal property" under section 1982. Justice Douglas' majority opinion
noted that, since the statute covered all types of property, it was immaterial
whether the denied membership share was considered realty or personal
property. The Court's basic concern, however, was Freeman's right to
lease the house, not merely his entitlement to a membership share. While
Freeman's rental payments included an amount for assignment of the
membership share, the defendants' action in blocking this assignment was
considered a violation of section 1982 because it "interfer[ed] with
Freeman's right to 'lease.' ,27 The Court held that "[t]he right to 'lease is
protected by §1982 against the actions of third parties, as well as the
actions of the immediate lessor. 28
No question was raised in Sullivan about Freeman's standing. It
seems beyond dispute that a black who is denied the opportunity to live in a
home because of his race is a proper party to sue those who have blocked-
or, as in Sullivan, "interfered with"-his efforts to live there. Having said
this, however, the question arises whether this is a conclusion about what
constitutes a cause of action under section 1982 or about who has standing
to sue for this cause of action. The inability of the Supreme Court to
distinguish these two concepts is one of the principal sources of confusion
in fair housing cases. If a decision holds that a particular plaintiff lacks
standing to bring a section 1982 claim, how does this differ from a
determination that he has no cause of action under the statute? Con-
versely, if a plaintiff's complaint satisfies the basic article III standing
requirements by alleging personal injury caused by the defendant's
26. Id. at 235.
27. Id. at 237.
28. Id.
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discriminatory actions, how can that complaint ever be dismissed for
failure to state a claim?29 Of course, the defendant may win because the
plaintiff's proof fails at trial, but the question remains whether, given a
certain fact pattern or set of allegations, there is any difference between the
plaintiff's standing to sue and his right to recover. It is clear that the
Supreme Court thinks there is a difference between these two concepts,
30
but its fair housing opinions have done little to show how they differ
functionally and, indeed, have often treated these concepts in-
terchangeably. 3
1
Two additional points about Freeman's status in Sullivan are worth
noting. First, the opinion stated that the two plaintiffs initially sought
injunctive relief and money damages, but that "[s]ince Freeman no longer
resides in the area served by Little Hunting Park, Inc., his claim [was]
limited solely to damages. 32 Again, it is not clear whether this was a
statement about Freeman's lack of standing to seek an injunction or about
the fact that the merits would not justify an injunction on the basis of
Freeman's claim.33 In any event, the point to be made is that standing to
bring suit and standing to seek particular forms of relief in that suit may
entail separate considerations. Thus, the term "standing" may be used to
describe two distinct concepts: (1) standing to sue, that is, standing to
invoke the court's jurisdiction; and (2) standing to make particular claims
or arguments once it has been determined that the suit has been brought by
a proper party. The concepts are related, but as Sullivan shows, a party
29. Under article III of the Constitution, federal courts only have jurisdiction to decide "cases
and controversies." To invoke this limited jurisdiction, a plaintiffmust allege a "personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy .. " Baker v. Carr, 396 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). This "personal stake"
requirement includes two elements: (I) that the plaintiff has suffered personal injury; and (2) that this
injury was caused by the defendant's unlawful action. E.g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org.,
426 U.S. 26 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,498-99,504 (1975). These two elements also happen
to be the key to deciding whether a cause of action under a statute has been pleaded. As the Supreme
Court pointed out in Warth: "The actual or threatened injury required by Art. III may exist solely by
virtue of'statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing. . . .' "422 U.S. at 500.
With respect to causation, it is well established that "[a]n essential element of the plaintiff's cause of
action for negligence, or for that matter for any other tort, is that there be some reasonable connection
between the act or omission of the defendant and the damage which the plaintiff has suffered." W.
PROSSER, TORTS § 41 (4th ed. 1971). Since housing discrimination is in the nature ofa tort, see Curtis v.
Loether, 415 U.S. 189,195 & n. 10 (1974), the question whetherthe plaintiffhas alleged sufficient injury
and causation to satisfy article III is closely related, if not precisely equivalent to, whether he has stated
a claim under the applicable fair housing statute. See text accompanying notes 44-55, 102-12, 289-309
infra. See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 14, at 98 & n.6, 111-12; Albert, Standing to Challenge
Administrative Action: An Inadequate Surrogate for Claim for Relief, 83 YALE L.J. 425 (1974); Scott,
supra note 16, at 654.
30. See, e.g., Davis v. Passman, 99 S. Ct. 2264,2274 n. 18 (1979); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,
500 (1975) ("standing in no way depends on the merits of the plaintiff's contention that particular
conduct is illegal," citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968) ).
31. See text accompanying notes 44-55, 102-12, 211-18, 289-309 infra.
32. 396 U.S. at 235.
33. Justice Harlan's dissent in Sullivan suggested a third possibility-that Freeman's claim for
injunctive relief was mooted by his moving away. 396 U.S. at 250. The Court has elsewhere recognized
that the standing question "bears close affinity" to questions of mootness and ripeness. Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490, 499 n.10 (1975). See also note 218 and accompanying text infra.
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may have standing to sue without necessarily having the right to seek every
type of relief available.
34
The second point to consider about Freeman is the nature of his
injury. The Sullivan opinion simply says that "[t]he right to 'lease' is
protected by §1982 . . . "5 and that the defendants had unlawfully
interfered with this right. The initial impression is that a person
discriminated against is injured by losing his right "to live where he wants
to" or, as in Freeman's case, by having that right interfered with. But this
definition of the right implicated is far too broad. Section 1982 does not
give anyone the right to live anywhere he wants. A poor black applicant
who is rejected for a house or apartment that he cannot afford and that
would be denied to a similarly-situated white applicant has not suffered an
injury that is redressable under section 1982. Freeman, however, could
afford to rent the Sullivan house. Thus, his injury lay not just in the fact
that the defendants interfered with his right to live in that house but that
they did so because of his race. Racial discrimination in housing is one of
the "badges and incidents of slavery" that section 1982 was intended to
abolish,36 and an essential part of Freeman's claim was that the treatment
he received was a relic of his race's former condition of slavery.37 Thus, the
nature of a fair housing injury to a plaintiff like Freeman, who is the object
of the defendant's discrimination, is two-fold: (1) the plaintiff has lost a
housing opportunity, and (2) the housing opportunity was lost because of
the plaintiff's race.38
2. Standing of the White Lessor
None of this, however, was explicitly discussed in the Sullivan
opinion. The Court's standing analysis was reserved for Sullivan, the white
homeowner who had leased his house to Freeman and then unsuccessfully
sought to assign his membership share in Little Hunting Park to him.
Sullivan's claim, though not as common as Freeman's, was certainly not
unprecedented. The Supreme Court had previously allowed whites to
34. Cf. County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 99 S. Ct. 1379, 1383 (1979) (issue whether imposition of
hiring quotas was an appropriate remedy in employment discrimination case became moot pending
litigation).
35. 396 U.S. at 237.
36. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439-41 (1968).
37. Id. at 443.
38. The distinction between these two kinds of injury is perhaps most apparent when a black
homeseeker subjected to racial discrimination no longer desires to live in the housing unit he originally
sought. Even though such a plaintiffwould not have any present interest in securing the housing denied
him, his claim for money damages does survive. See Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229,
235 (1969); Meyers v. Pennypack Woods Home Ownership Ass'n, 559 F.2d 894 (3rd Cir. 1977); Cash v.
Swifton Land Corp., 434 F.2d 569 (6th Cir. 1970). The principal elements of the latter type of damage
claim may well be the shame, humiliation, and indignity of being discriminated against on the basis of
one's race. See, e.g., Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189,195-96 n. 10 (1974); Crumble v. Blumthal, 549 F.2d
462,467 (7th Cir. 1977); Seaton v. Sky Realty Co., 491 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1974). These damages would
exist apart from whatever financial or other injuries that might be associated with the plaintiff's
diminished opportunity to participate in the full housing market.
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challenge property restrictions that prevented the sale of their homes to
blacks.3 9 In addition, a number of the section 1982 suits brought soon after
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. included claims by white tenants that their
landlords refused to allow them to sublet their apartments to blacks.40
In Sullivan, the white lessor was injured in at least two ways by the
defendants.4 ' First, he lost his two membership shares in Little Hunting
Park as a result of his "advocacy of Freeman's cause."42 Second, his ability
to lease his house was limited by the corporation's refusal to accept black
members.43 This second type of injury would have occurred even if
Sullivan had retained his membership shares by finding another tenant or
by concluding the deal with Freeman at a lower rental that did not include
access to the park. Both of these injuries were direct and personal to
Sullivan, and both resulted from the defendants' unlawful discrimination
against Freeman. The former, however, was more closely identified with
securing Freeman's right to equal treatment under section 1982.
In upholding Sullivan's standing to sue the corporation, Justice
Douglas' opinion ignored the second type of injury and focused exclusively
on Sullivan's expulsion from Park membership. This sanction was seen as
punishment for Sullivan's "trying to vindicate the rights of minorities
protected by §1982.",44 The opinion cited Barrows v. Jackson45 for the
39. E.g., Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Buchanon v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
40. E.g., Smith v. Sol D. Adler Realty Co., 436 F.2d 344 (7th Cir. 1971); Williamson v. Hampton
Management Co., 339 F. Supp. 1146 (N.D. Ill. 1972). Another type of claim by a white tenant was
recognized in Walker v. Pointer, 304 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Tex. 1969), a case decided before Sullivan in
which the district court held that a tenant evicted for entertaining black friends had standing to sue his
landlord under § 1982. See also Dombrowski v. Dowling, 459 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1972); Miller v.
Poretsky, 409 F. Supp. 837 (D.D.C. 1976).
41. There is a third type of injury that Sullivan might have claimed. As an area homeowner,
Sullivan's "right to live in an integrated community" was possibly affected by the defendant's
discrimination against black homeseekers. See Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood,441 U.S. 91
(1979); Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
42. 396 U.S. at 237. But see id. at 252-54 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
43. By its terms, § 1982 guarantees the right to sell, lease, and convey real property free from
racial discrimination. See note 20 supra. This statute would seem to guarantee a homeowner's right to a
full market for his property that is not limited by racial discrimination. In Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven
Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431 (1973), for example, the Supreme Court unanimously held that § 1982
prohibited a swimming club from discriminating against a black couple who lived in the geographic
area from which the club derived its members. The opinion pointed out that losing the benefits of club
membership harmed the plaintiff's property rights under § 1982 in a number of ways, including
possibly lowering the price at which they might be able to sell their house. Id. at 437. Similarly, the
racial restrictions imposed by the defendants in Sullivan would presumably reduce the market for
Sullivan's house and might well require him to lower his rental price-injuries that T711man indicates
would be redressable under § 1982.
44. 396 U.S. at 237.
45. 346 U.S. 249 (1953). In Barrows, a white who had sold her home to a black buyer, despite a
racially restrictive covenant, was sued for damages by neighboring homeowners. The Supreme Court
held that the white seller had standing to raise the constitutional rights of the black buyer, because
under the peculiar circumstances of this case it would be impossible for the buyer to assert these rights.
The Court felt that denying the white seller standing to challenge the racial restrictions on her property
would encourage enforcement of these unconstitutional covenants. This consideration led it to ignore
the general rule that prohibits a party from asserting the legal rights and interests of others. See Warth
v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499-501 (1975).
STANDING TO SUE
proposition that "the white owner is at times 'the only effective adversary'
of unlawful racial restrictions on property.46
Unlike the white homeowner in Barrows, however, Sullivan was
clearly not the "only effective adversary" of the unlawful discrimination
directed against his tenant. Freeman was also a plaintiff and appeared to be
fully capable of advocating his own rights. True, only Sullivan sought an
injunction prohibiting the defendants from discriminating in the future
while Freeman's claim was limited to money damages, but this was because
Freeman had moved away and no longer had a current interest in a
membership share in Little Hunting Park. If Freeman lacked this interest,
it is difficult to see why Sullivan should be able to raise it in the role of
Freeman's representative. Thus, the clear implication of Sullivan is that an
injured white homeowner has standing to sue under section 1982 when a
defendant interferes with the rental or sale of his home to a black,
regardless of whether the discrimination may also be effectively challenged
by the black homeseeker.
But the question remains: standing to sue for what? The Supreme
Court upheld Sullivan's claim for damages, but it did not identify which of
his injuries might be included in this claim.47 Thus, the Court did not go so
far as to specifically authorize the white plaintiff to sue for all of his injuries
that might be traced in any way to the defendants' discrimination against
Freeman. As noted above, the Park's discriminatory actions caused
Sullivan to suffer two distinct types of injuries: his membership shares were
lost and his ability to rent his house was restricted. Because the Court
viewed the lost memberships as an unlawful sanction for Sullivan's having
tried to vindicate Freeman's rights, Sullivan was held to have standing to
claim this type of injury. But the opinion did not indicate whether Sullivan
was also entitled to relief for the second type of injury-the injury due to
the lower rental value of the house to a black tenant, the expenses incurred
in finding another suitable tenant, and the other losses associated with the
46. 396 U.S. at 237. Basing Sullivan's standing on the Barrows notion that a party may assert the
rights of the person against whom discrimination is directed, the Sullivan opinion entered the murky
area of "prudential" standing considerations. As the Court later explained in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490, 498 (1975), the question of standing "involves both constitutional limitations on federal-court
jurisdiction and prudential limitations on its exercise. E.g., Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249,255-56
(1953)." Apart from the constitutional mandate that federal courts may decide only "cases and
controversies," see note 29 supra, certain prudential (or "judicial sef-governance") limitations on
standing have been recognized by the Supreme Court. One of the most important of these prudential
considerations is that "even when the plaintiff has alleged injury sufficient to meet the 'ease or
controversy' requirement, . . . [he] generally must assert his own legal rights and interests, and
cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490, 499 (1975). Prudential limitations may be overcome in some circumstances by countervailing
considerations. Id. at 500-01. Thus, in Barrows a white seller's defense against a racially restrictive
covenant was permitted to include assertion of the black buyer's rights because the Court believed that
a contrary rule would result in enforcement of these covenants. See generally Sedler, Standing to
Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii in the Supreme Court, 71 YALE L.J. 599 (1962); Note, Standing to
Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii, 88 HARv. L. REV. 423 (1974).
47. See notes 42, 43 and accompanying text supra. But see 396 U.S. at 251-55 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
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racial limitations that the defendants placed on his ability to lease his
house. These injuries were ignored. By focusing exclusively on Sullivan's
role as an advocate for the minority homeseeker against whom
discrimination had been directed, the Court did extend the Barrows v.
Jackson approach somewhat, but it fell short of establishing a rule that
would recognize section 1982 standing in anyone who was injured in any
way as a result of the defendant's unlawful discrimination.
3. Statutory Standing and the Merits of a Claim
The relief that fair housing plaintiffs such as Freeman and Sullivan are
entitled to claim would seem to be not simply a matter of standing, but of
how the rights and duties created by section 1982 are judicially defined. In
this connection, it is important to recognize the distinction between
"statutory standing" on the one hand and the article III and prudential
requirements of standing on the other. Sullivan is instructive on this point,
because, unlike most fair housing claims, it was originally brought in state,
as opposed to federal, court. In such a case, the article III limitations on
standing, which are directed solely to the jurisdiction of the federal
courts,48 do not apply, at least not until the case is taken from the state
system by the United States Supreme Court. 49 The same may be said for
the prudential limitations on standing developed by the Supreme Court as
a matter of judicial self-governance.
The fact that standing in its jurisdictional sense may differ in state and
federal courts could prove to be significant in the fair housing field, because
claims under both section 1982 and Title VIII may be brought in state as
well as federal court.50 It may seem unlikely that state courts faced with the
48. "The constitutional and prudential considerations [of the law of standing] canvassed at
length in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975), respond to concerns that are peculiarly federal in
nature." Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,262 n.8 (1977).
See also L. TRIBE, supra note 14, at 81:
[F]ederal standing requirements, whether dictated by article III or suggested by policy, all
arise out of institutional concerns peculiar to the federal judiciary and its special role and are
therefore irrelevant to the question of what more generous standing rulesa state may adopt if
it chooses to do so.
49. In Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (1952), the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal
from a state court decision construing the establishment clause of the first amendment on the ground
that federal standing requirements had not been met. See note 48 supra. The Court observed:
We do not undertake to say that a state court may not render an opinion on a federal
constitutional question even under such circumstances that it can be regarded only as
advisory. But, because our own jurisdiction is cast in terms of "case or controversy," we
cannot accept as the basis for review, nor as the basis for conclusive disposition of an issue of
federal law without review, any procedure which does not constitute such.
342 U.S. at 434. The result in Doremus was that the state court's judgment was left intact. This means
that to the extent states are willing to adopt more liberal standing rules than the federal judiciary, they
are permitted to do so. See, e.g., Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67
N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975); cases cited in Sager, supra note 14, at
1402 n.100. Thus state courts may decide cases concerning federal issues, such as housing
discrimination, and their decisions are unreviewable by the Supreme Court. See L. TRIBE, supra note
14, at 81; Sager, supra note 14, at 1401 n.99.
50. See Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969). With respect to state court
jurisdiction to hear Title VIII claims, there appears to be a distinction between a direct action, which
may be brought in both state and federal courts, see 42 U.S.C. § 3612(a), and a suit brought after an
initial administrative complaint, which may be brought only in federal court. See 42 U.S.C. § 3610(d).
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task of enforcing federal rights will ignore federal standing limitations, but
they have the power to do so.
51
Sullivan, however, was concerned not with jurisdictional standing but
statutory standing-the problem of who may sue under section 1982 and
for what. The statutory standing problem exists in all fair housing cases
under section 1982 or Title VIII regardless of the forum and in addition to
whatever article III and prudential issues may arise in federal court. On
this statutory question, the Supreme Court is the final authority. 2 The
rights and duties created by these statutes may be enforced in either state or
federal court, but these rights and duties are a matter of federal law
ultimately to be defined by the Supreme Court.
Thus, given the fact that the defendants in Sullivan engaged in
conduct that was held to violate section 1982, the question whether
Sullivan should be allowed to collect for all his injuries caused by that
violation is a matter of how section 1982 is interpreted. From a practical
standpoint, it makes little difference whether this statutory question is
considered to be one of standing or one of substantive law.53 In either case,
an affimative answer permits recovery, and a negative one blocks it.
Indeed, one of the important lessons to be derived from Sullivan is simply
this: that in a pure statutory standing case-one in which article III
considerations do not present any difficulties-the question whether a
party has standing to sue or to assert a particular claim is functionally
equivalent to the question whether he has a good cause of action. The
standing issue is not merely related to the merits of the claim;5 4 it is the
merits of the claim.5
B. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.
1. Background and Holding
Statutory standing was also an issue in Trafficante v. Metropolitan
51. See notes 48, 49 supra.
52. E.g., Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969). There is no jurisdictional
barrier to Supreme Court review of state court decisions construing the federal fair housing statutes if
the article III requirements of standing are met. Cf. note 49 supra (appeal from state court dismissed
because federal standing requirements had not been met).
53. Important practical differences do exist, however, between a dismissal for lack of standing
under article III and a dismissal for failure to state a claim under the applicable substantive law.
Because article III standing is a matter of federal court jurisdiction (see, e.g., Warthv. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490,498-99 (1975)), this question may be raised for the first time at any stage of the proceedings, even
on appeal. See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 277-78 (1979); Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 260 (1977). A motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim, however, is waived if not made before judgment. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(2). In addition, a
dismissal for failure to state a claim may have resjudicata or collateral estoppel effect, while a dismissal
for lack of jurisdiction is generally not considered to preclude further litigation of the same claim or
issue. See FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b). These differences between dismissal for lack of standing and dismissal
for failure to state a claim are based on standing being viewed as a jurisdictional matter. When article
Ill jurisdiction is present, however, and the standing question is only a matter of whether the plaintiff's
claim is to be considered covered by the applicable statute, then the two types of dismissals would have
the same practical effect.
54. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975).
55. On subsequent occasions, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that Sullivan held that §
1982 "implies a right of action in the [white lessor]." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,501(1975). See also
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Life Insurance Co.,5 6 the first Title VIII case to reach the Supreme Court.
In Trafficante, two tenants-one white and one black-sued the owner of
their 8,200-unit apartment complex in San Francisco for discriminating
against nonwhite applicants and for maintaining the complex as a "white
ghetto" in which less than one percent of the tenants were black. The
tenants claimed that their injuries included: (1) loss of the social benefits of
living in an integrated community; (2) missed business and professional
opportunities that would have accrued from living with minorities; and (3)
embarrassment and economic damage from the stigma of living in a white
ghetto. The Supreme Court unanimously held that these allegations were
sufficient to give the plaintiffs standing under the Fair Housing Act.
The suit was originally brought under both section 1982 and Title
VIII. There were a total of three claims based on the same set of
allegations, because the plaintiffs used both of the private enforcement
techniques provided by Title VIII: (1) a suit based on an administrative
complaint to the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 3610; and (2) a direct civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
3612. 7 The district court dismissed on the "threshold question" of
standing,58 and the court of appeals affirmed. 9 According to the Ninth
Circuit, the test for determining whether the plaintiffs had standing was set
forth in Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp.60
In Data Processing, the Supreme Court had upheld the plaintiffs' standing
to bring a claim against the Comptroller of the Currency under the
Administrative Procedure Act. The Court stated that, apart from the
article III "case or controversy" test, the question of standing concerns
"whether the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is
arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the
statute or constitutional guarantee in question., 61 In Trafficante, the court
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 99 S. Ct. 1946, 1958 nn.22 & 23 (1979) (Sullivan described as "an
implied cause-of-action" decision).
56. 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
57. Who may sue under the two sections of the Fair Housing Act that authorize private suits is
specifically defined in terms of the substantive provisions of the Act found in 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-3606.
Section 3610 provides for a complaint to the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development by a
"person aggrieved," who is described as "[a]ny person who claims to have been injured by a
discriminatory housing practice or who believes that he will be irrevocably injured by a discriminatory
housing practice." 42 U.S.C. § 36 10(a). If the Secretary is unable to obtain voluntary compliance, the
complainant may commence a civil action in any appropriate federal court. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(d). The
phrase "discriminatory housing practice" used in § 3610 is defined as "any act that is unlawful under
sections 3604, 3605, or 3606." 42 U.S.C. § 3602(f). Similarly direct suits without a prior administrative
complaint under § 3612 may be brought to enforce "[t]he rights granted by sections 3603, 3604, 3605
and 3606." 42 U.S.C. § 3612(a). These substantive sections of the Fair Housing Act (§§ 3604-3606)
prohibit a variety of discriminatory practices, but they do not speak to whose rights are violated when
these unlawful practices occur. Indeed, the Fair Housing Act on its face contains no restrictions
whatsoever on who has standing to sue under the private enforcement provisions of the Act. See
Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 102-03 (1979).
58. 322 F. Supp. 352 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
59. 446 F.2d 1158 (9th Cir. 1971).
60. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
61. Id at 153; see also Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 164 (1970).
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of appeals held that the plaintiffs were not "arguably within the zone of
interests" to be protected by either the Fair Housing Act or section 1982. It
based this conclusion on the fact that the plaintiffs were not the "direct
object" or the "direct victims" of any discriminatory housing practices
proscribed by these laws.62
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the plaintiffs did have
standing under Title VIII. Justice Douglas' opinion construed section
3610, which authorizes suit by any "person aggrieved" who first claims to
have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice in a complaint to
63HUD, to "give standing to sue to all in the same housing unit who are
injured by racial discrimination in the management of those facilities
within the coverage of the statute.",64 Whether standing would be similarly
defined for suits brought directly to court under section 3612 was not made
clear. Parts of the opinion focused on the specific language of section 3610
and other parts seemed to deal with all "suits brought under the 1968
Act. '65 This problem was to become a source of considerable difficulty for
the lower courts until 1979,66 when Gladstone Realtors v. Village of
Bellwood 6 7 held that standing under section 3612 was equivalent to
standing under section 3610.
2. Trafficante and Section 1982
The Court's handling of the section 1982 claim in Trafficante was also
problematic. The court found "it unnecessary to reach the question of
standing to sue under 42 U.S.C. §1982.,,68 The clear implication of this
statement is that standing under section 1982 raises a different question
than standing under the Fair Housing Act and that the tests for standing
under the two laws might well be different. Indeed, the result in Trafficante
was that plaintiffs, making identical allegations of discrimination and
injury to support claims under section 1982 and Title VIII, were permitted
to proceed under the Fair Housing Act, while the Ninth Circuit's opinion
denying them standing under section 1982 was left intact. On subsequent
occasions, the Supreme Court has given additional hints that section 1982
62. 446 F.2d at 1162-64. The Ninth Circuit's opinion in Trafficante distinguished Sullivan v.
Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229(1969), which had recognized § 1982 standing in a white plaintiff
who was not the "direct object" of discrimination, on the ground that Sullivan's property rights had
been interfered with, whereas the Trafficante plaintiffs' leasehold rights had not been affected by the
discrimination of which they complained. 446 F.2d at 1164.
63. See note 57 supra.
64. 409 U.S. at 212.
65. 409 U.S. at 209. See also Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 101 n.7
(1979).
66. See, e.g., cases cited in Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 108 (1979).
See generalliy Note, 77ird Parti' Suits Under Section 3612 ofthe Fair Housing Act of 1968,5 FORDHAM
URn. L.J. 338 (1977).
67. 441 U.S. 91 (1979).
68. 409 U.S. at 209 n.8.
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standing is narrower than Title VIII standing.69 However, because the
Court has not specifically focused its attention on standing under section
1982 since Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc.,70 the problems of further
defining section 1982 standing and of determining its relationship to
standing under the Fair Housing Act have been left for the lower courts to
struggle with.71
Notwithstanding the Trafficante opinion to the contrary, the
determination whether section 1982 standing exists apart from Title VIII
standing is often a necessary one. While the two fair housing laws generally
prohibit racial discrimination in housing, they are not identical, and it is
quite possible that a particular case may be covered by section 1982 and
not by Title VIII. As the Sullivan opinion noted, for example, section 1982
deals with both real and personal property. Thus, a membership share in a
neighborhood recreational facility clearly comes within its scope even
though it might not be considered a "dwelling" under Title VIII.
72
Furthermore, section 1982 is subject neither to the short 180-day statute of
limitations nor to the exemptions that are a part of the Fair Housing
Act.73 Thus, a victim of housing discrimination might well find that he has
a claim under section 1982 even though Title VIII does not apply. In these
circumstances, it is necessary for a court to determine whether the
plaintiff's allegations of injury satisfy the requirements of standing under
section 1982 apart from whether they would meet the test under the Fair
Housing Act.
74
Even in the Trafficante situation, in which it appears that the
defendant's conduct is proscribed by Title VIII as well as by section 1982, a
separate determination of standing under each law may be necessary
because the relief available to the plaintiff under the two laws is different.
In Trafficante, for example, plaintiffs sought substantial punitive damages
and attorneys fees as well as other relief.75 Because Title VIII includes
specific limitations on these forms of relief that do not apply to section
1982 actions,76 the result of the Supreme Court's decision to avoid
69. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441
U.S. 91, 128-29 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also text accompanying note 257 infra.
70. 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
71. See, e.g., Meyers v. Pennypack Woods Home Ownership Ass'n, 559 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1977);
Kreiger v. Merifield Acres, Inc., 465 F. Supp. 62 (E.D. Va. 1979); United States Gen., Inc. v. City of
Joliet, 432 F. Supp. 346 (N.D. Ill. 1977); Fair Housing Council of Bergen County, Inc. v. Eastern
Bergen County Multiple Listing Serv., Inc., 422 F. Supp. 1071 (D.N.J. 1976); Village of Park Forestv.
Fairfax Realty, 1 Equal Opp. Hous. Cas. 13,699 (N.D. I11. 1975).
72. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3602(b), 3604-3606. See, e.g., Player v. Alabama, 400 F. Supp. 249 (N.D.
Ala. 1975).
73. See, e.g., Meyers v. Pennypack Woods Home Ownership Ass'n, 559 F.2d 894 (3rd Cir. 1977);
Morris v. Cizek, 503 F.2d 1303 (7th Cir. 1974); Hickman v. Fincher, 483 F.2d 855 (4th Cir. 1973);
Johnson v. Zaremba, 381 F. Supp. 165, 167 (N.D. Ill. 1973) and cases cited therein. See generally
Schwemm, Discriminatory Effect and the Fair Housing Act, 54 NOTRE DAmE LAW. 199,231-32(1978).
74. See, e.g., Meyers v. Pennypack Woods Home Ownership Ass'n, 559 F.2d 894 (3rd Cir. 1977).
75. 446 F.2d at 1159.
76. In a Title VIII suit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 3612, punitive damages may not exceed $1,000,
and a prevailing plaintiff may be awarded attorney's fees only if "the said plaintiff in the opinion of the
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consideration of the section 1982 question was to limit the plaintiffs' relief
to what was available under Title VIII. Therefore, the Trafficante decision
may have encouraged courts in cases brought under both section 1982 and
the Fair Housing Act to recognize standing only under Title VIII when the
different scope of the two laws actually made consideration of section 1982
standing necessary.
77
3. Trafficante and Title VIII
The Supreme Court's decision in Trafficante is a clear rejection of the
view expressed by the Ninth Circuit that only the "direct object" of
discrimination may sue under Title VIII. The Trafficante plaintiffs never
claimed that they were discriminated against nor that they had been
prevented from living where they wanted. Their claim was that they had
been injured by racial discrimination directed against others.78
court is not financially able to assume said attorney's fees." 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1976). Damages may
not be available at all in a Title VIII claim brought under § 3610. See Brown v. Ballas, 331 F. Supp.
1033, 1036 (N.D. Tex. 1971). On the other hand, these restrictions on damages and fees do not apply to
§ 1982 actions. See, e.g., Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1979); Bunn v. Central
Realty of La., 592 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1979); Wright v. Kaine Realty, 352 F. Supp. 222 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (amending 42
U.S.C. § 1988 (1976) ), provides that in any action under § 1982, "the court, in its discretion, may allow
the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." See, e.g., Hughes v. Repko,
578 F.2d 483, 488 (3rd Cir. 1978); Gore v. Turner, 563 F.2d 159,163 (5th Cir. 1977); Wharton v. Knefel,
562 F.2d 550, 556-57 (8th Cir. 1977).
77. See, e.g., Village of Bellwood v. Gladstone Realtors, 569 F.2d 1013, 1017 n.4 (7th Cir. 1978),
qff'd, 441 U.S. 91 (1979); Wheatley Heights Neighborhood Coalition v. Jenna Resales Co., 429 F.
Supp. 486 (E.D.N.Y. 1977). See also Bradley v. John M. Brabham Agency, Inc., 463 F. Supp. 27
(D.S.C. 1978).
78. Trafficante cited Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809, 818 (3rd Cir. 1970) in support of its
determination that Title VIII "protect[s] not only those against whom a discrimination is directed but
also those whose complaint is that the manner of managing a housing project affects'the very quality of
their daily lives.' " 409 U.S. at 211. In Shannon, the Third Circuit held that white and black residents
and businessmen in a Philadelphia neighborhood had standing to challenge HUD's funding of a
subsidized housing project that they claimed would have the effect of increasing the already high
concentration of low income black residents in their area. Title VIII's mandate to HUD to administer
its housing programs "in a manner affirmatively to further the policies of this subehapter" (42 U.S.C. §
3608(d)(5) (1976)) was seen as an indication of Congress' belief that the federal government's failure to
consider the racial effects of its programs had "significantly contributed to urban blight." 436 F.2d at
816. HUD's duty under Title VIII was now affirmatively to promote fair housing, and this duty
required H U D to consider how a proposed project might lead to the concentration of low income black
residents in a given area. The Court held that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge HUD's failure to
consider this factor, because an increase in the concentration of low income blacks in the plaintiffs' area
might "adversely affect not only their investments in homes and businesses, but even the very quality of
their daily lives." Id. at 818. Although the plaintiffs' substantive claim was based on HUD's duty under
the Fair Housing Act, they did not sue under the private enforcement provisions of Title VIII. See note
57 supra. Rather, their claim was based on the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706,
which grants standing to a person "aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute"
(Id. § 702). The Third Circuit therefore applied the "zone of interests" test that the Supreme Court had
established for evaluating standing in these types of claims. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs.
v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). Finding that the plaintiffs' interests were arguably within the zone of
interests to be protected by Title VI II, the court in Shannon held that the plaintiffs had standing to seek
an injunction against HUD's funding of the subsidized housing project proposed for their area.
Although the claims asserted in Shannon and Trafficante have certain similarities, there are two
difTerences between them that are significant for standing purposes. First, a Shannon-type claim
brought against an administrative agency pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act is governed by
the "zone of interests" test, whereas Trafficante establishes that an action brought under the private
enforcement provisions of Title VIII is to be judged simply by construing the substantive provisions of
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It is important to recognize that in making this claim, plaintiffs were
suing for their own injuries and were not representing the interests of the
rejected black applicants. Trafficante held that the plaintiffs' own
injuries-losing "important benefits from interracial association"-were
sufficient to satisfy the article III and Title VIII requirements of standing.
The Court in Trafficante determined that the congressional proponents of
Title VIII, while recognizing that minorities suffered the most from
housing discrimination, also "emphasized that those who were not the
direct objects of discrimination had an interest in ensuring fair housing, as
they too suffered. 79
The principal concern in Trafficante was statutory standing.80 The
opinion employed a number of traditional rules of statutory construction,
and thus made clear that deciding questions of standing under Title VIII is
essentially a matter of statutory construction. Justice Douglas' analysis
began with the language of the Fair Housing Act and went on to discuss the
law's enforcement scheme, legislative history, and administrative
interpretation by HUD. The basic issue in Trafficante was whether
Congress intended that plaintiffs such as these be allowed to sue. The
Court concluded that Title VIII showed "a congressional intention to
define standing as broadly as is permitted by Article III of the
Constitution."81
The "zone of interests" test, which was first used in Data Processing
two years earlier, was never mentioned by the Supreme Court in
Trafficante. Because Justice Douglas wrote both opinions, this can hardly
be considered a mere oversight. The clear implication is that the "zone of
the Fair Housing Act. See text accompanying notes 79-104 infra. Second, standing to sue a
governmental defendant may raise concerns "about the proper-and properly limited-role of the
courts in a democratic society" that are not present when the defendant is a private entity as it was in
Trafficante. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,498 (1975). See also text accompanying notes 198-201
infra.
There is an additional substantive difference between the claims brought in Shannon and
Trafficante: Even though both claims asserted that the defendants had unlawfully affected the racial
make-up of the plaintiffs' community, the Trafficante complaint was that too few blacks had been
allowed in, while the Shannon plaintiffs objected that too many blacks would be housed in the area.
The Shannon-type complaint has proved to be the much more common of the two. See, e.g., Gladstone
Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979); South East Chicago Comm. v. HUD, 488 F.2d
1119 (7th Cir. 1973); King v. Harris, 464 F. Supp. 827 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); Wheatley Heights
Neighborhood Coalition v. Jenna Resales Co., 429 F. Supp. 486 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
79. 409 U.S. at 218. See generally Comment, The Fair Housing Act: Standing for the Private
Attorney General, 12 SANTA CLARA LAW. 562 (1972).
80. The only references in Trafficante to the requirements of article III were rather conclusory
statements: "[i]ndividual injury or injury in fact . . . is alleged here," 409 U.S. at 209; "[ijnjury is
alleged with particularity . . . ;" and the dispute is "presented in an adversary context." Id. at 211. See
id. at 212 (White J., concurring). Once it is decided that the article III requirements have been met, "the
question whether the litigant is a 'proper party to request an adjudication of a particular issue' . . . is
one within the power of Congress to determine." Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732 n.3 (1972).
See also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975).
81. 409 U.S. at 209 (quoting Hackett v. McGuire Bros., Inc., 445 F.2d 442 (3rd Cir. 1971)).
Justice White's concurrence in Trafficante suggested that Title VIII not only reached the limits of
article III standing, but actually expanded those limits, which he felt Congress had the power to do
under the enforcement clause of the fourteenth amendment as interpreted by Katzenbach v. Morgan,
384 U.S. 641 (1966). 409 U.S. at 212 (White, J., concurring). See text accompanying notes 236-54 infra.
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interests" test, relied on by the Ninth Circuit in Trafficante, is not to be
employed as a general test for standing in all statutory cases. Whatever
value the "zone of interests" test may have in claims brought under the
Administrative Procedure Act or other statutes authorizing judicial review
82of federal agency action, Trafficante indicates that standing under the fair
housing statutes is another matter and one that is to be governed by the
intent of the Congress that enacted them.83
The Court found that the language, legislative history, and
enforcement design of Title VIII supported plaintiffs' standing in
Trafficante. First, the Court noted that the language used to describe those
entitled to sue was "broad and inclusive. 84 Indeed, the definition of
"person aggrieved" in section 3610--"[a]ny person who claims to have
been injured by a discriminatory housing practice" -is so broad as to be
almost meaningless. It appears to cover anyone who makes a claim,
including, for example, a person living in Kansas who objects to the
discrimination being perpetrated by the Trafficante defendants in San
Francisco and claims that he is somehow injured thereby. Obviously, the
question of a potential plaintiff's standing cannot be left entirely to his own
willingness to make a claim. Even if Congress intended to go this far, a
plaintiff could not sue in federal court without also claiming some
personalized "injury in fact" to meet the basic article III requirements.86
Since the Supreme Court has held that a mere "interest in a problem"' is
generally not sufficient to confer standing on an individual,8 7 a would-be
plaintiff with no connection to an apartment complex would not be
permitted to sue over its discriminatory selection procedures.
The Court's reading of the legislative history of the Fair Housing Act,
82. See note 78 supra. A number of commentators have concluded that the "zone of interests"
test is no longer being used even in administrative law cases. E.g., Albert, supra note 29, at 493-97;
Davis, Standing, 1976, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 69, 81 (1977).
83. But see Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 n.6 (1979). Even if the
zone of interest test were applicable to Title VIII cases, it would not limit standing in any significant
way. On its face, it would be easier for a plaintiffto meet the "arguably within the zone of interests" test
than to state a claim on the merits under Title VIII because "arguably" having a claim is a broader
standard than actually having one. Thus, the argument that the plaintiff's complaint should be
dismissed for failure to state a claim is a stronger argument than that the plaintifflacks standing under
the zone of interests test. See text accompanying notes 105-12, 289-309 infra. In addition, the zone of
interests test has proved remarkably easy to meet in practice. Indeed, the Supreme Court has never
ordered that a case be dismissed for failing to satisfy this standard. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW OF THE SEVENTIES 509-10, 515 (1976).
84. 409 U.S. at 209.
85. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a) (1976).
86. "Congress may, by legislation, expand standing to the full extent permitted by Art.
11. . . . In no event, however, may Congress abrogate the Art. III minima: A plaintiffmust always
have suffered 'a distinct and palpable injury to himself,' . . . that is likely to be redressed if the
requested relief is granted." Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91,100 (1979). Butsee
Traflicante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 212 (1972) (White, J., concurring) and text
accompanying notes 237-54 infra. Even if the article III requirements of standing were not satisfied by a
claim covered by Title VIII, it is conceivable that the plaintiffcould successfully bring such a claim in
state court, in which the article III requirements do not apply. See notes 48-50 and accompanying text
supra.
87. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972).
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however, did support standing for those, like the Trafficante plaintiffs, who
are personally affected by discrimination directed at others:
The person on the landlord's blacklist is not the only victim of discriminatory
housing practices; it is, as Senator Javits said in supporting the bill, "the
whole community," 114 Cong. Rec. 2706, and as Senator Mondale who
drafted §810(a) [§3610(a)] said, the reach of the proposed law was to replace
the ghettos "by truly integrated and balanced living patterns." Id., at 3422.88
This view, that the goal of the Fair Housing Act is "integrated and
balanced living patterns" and not just increased opportunities for minority
homeseekers, has become widely accepted by the courts. 89 On the other
hand, Senator Javits' statement that "the whole community" is the victim
of housing discrimination seems more difficult to accept, at least as a guide
to who has standing to sue. It implies that everyone in San Francisco is
injured by the Trafficante defendants' actions and should be allowed to
challenge those actions in court under Title VIII.90
The Trafficante opinion reflects a certain discomfort with extending
Title VIII standing to "the whole community." Its holding is repeatedly
stated in terms of only those in the plaintiffs' position who are tenants of
the particular apartment building. The alleged injury that is held to be
sufficient for standing purposes is the injury to "existing tenants" of the
apartment complex from which minorities have been excluded, 9' and
standing to sue is accorded "to all in the same housing unit who are injured
by racial discrimination in the management of those facilities. 92 By
endorsing Senator Javits' concept that housing discrimination injures the
whole community, perhaps the Court in Trafficante was suggesting that
the definition of "community" should be limited to those in a single
complex or at least a small geographic area.93 In any event, one of the key
problems after Trafficante was whether its holding should be extended to
those who complained that their "right to live in an integrated community"
88. 409 U.S. at 211; see also id. at 210 & n.IO.
89. See, e.g., Barrick Realty, Inc. v. City of Gary, 491 F.2d 161, 164 (7th Cir. 1974); Otero v. New
York City Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122,1134 (2nd Cir. 1973). Seegenerally Schwemm, supra note 73, at
210; Comment, supra note 79.
90. This is not as far-fetched as it may at first seem. Presumably the black applicants turned away
by the Trafficante defendants will secure other housing in the San Francisco market or will remain
where they are, perhaps in an all-black neighborhood. This could have some negative effect on the
opportunities of all residents in the greater metropolitan area for the interracial associations, which
Trafficante held is actionable underTitle VIII. See also Gladstone Realtorsv. Village of Bellwood,441
U.S. 91, 113-15 & nn.26 & 29 (1979). It may be hard to prove this effect or to establish that the
defendants' discrimination in one apartment complex is responsible for the effect. But difficulty of
proof would seem to go to the question of whether these plaintiffs are likely to prevail on the merits, not
to the sufficiency of their allegations for standing purposes.
91. 409 U.S. at 209-10.
92. Id. at 212. See also id. at 211 ("[Title VIII protects] those whose complaint is that the manner
of managing a housing project affects 'the very quality of their daily lives.' "); id. at 212 (White, J.,
concurring) (approving the extension of Title VIII standing "to those in the position of the petitioners
in this case").
93. See Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979); and text accompanying
notes 283-86 infra.
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was being denied by discrimination that was occurring elsewhere than in
their own apartment complex.94
The third area that the Trafficante Court pointed to as supporting the
plaintiffs' standing under the Fair Housing Act was the enforcement design
of the statute, which, the Court held, relied on complaints by private
persons as "the primary method of obtaining compliance with the Act."95
Title VIII begins by declaring that "[i]t is the policy of the United States to
provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the
United States. 9 6 It goes on to create three types of enforcement suits to
achieve this policy: (1) section 3610, a private suit brought by a party who
has previously filed a complaint with HUD and HUD was unable to obtain
voluntary compliance; (2) section 3612, authorizing a direct court action
brought by a party who has not yet filed a prior administrative complaint;
and (3) section 3613, authorizing "pattern or practice" and "general public
importance" cases brought by the Attorney General. In Trafficante, the
Court noted the limits that Congress had placed on federal agency
enforcement of Title VIII. HUD has no power of enforcement; its role is
essentially limited to investigating complaints and seeking voluntary
compliance.97 Justice Department suits are authorized only if the alleged
discrimination is widespread or of particular importance and, according to
Trafficante, the Department's small housing staff further limits its
enforcement capabilities.98 Thus, the Court concluded:
Since HUD has no enforcement powers and since the enormity of the task of
assuring fair housing makes the role of the Attorney General in the matter
minimal, the main generating force must be private suits in which ...the
complainants act not only on their own behalf but also "as private attorneys
general in vindicating a policy that Congress considered to be of the highest
priority."99
The argument is that Title VIII's heavy reliance on private complaints
for its enforcement reflects a congressional desire to give standing to sue to
a wide range of potential plaintiffs.1°° This is related to the Barrows v.
94. See, e.g. Gladstone Realtorsv. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S.91 (1979); Warthv.Seldin,422
U.S. 490 (1975); TOPIC v. Circle Realty, 532 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 859 (1976);
Wheatley Heights Neighborhood Coalition v. Jenna Resales Co., 429 F. Supp. 486 (E.D.N.Y. 1977);
Fair Housing Council of Bergen County, Inc. v. Eastern Bergen County Multiple Listing Serv., Inc.,
422 F. Supp. 1071 (D.N.J. 1976).
95. 409 U.S. at 209.
96. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1976).
97. Congress is currently considering amendments to the Fair Housing Act that would give
H U D the power to issue cease and desist orders upon a finding of unlawful housing discrimination and
would otherwise expand the agency's authority to enforce Title VIII. See H.R. 2540 and S. 506, 96th
Cong., Ist Sess. (1979).
98. 409 U.S. at 211.
99. Id.
100. In cases in which the Supreme Court has determined that a private right of action is to be
implied from a statute, the lack of sufficient government resources to ensure satisfactory public
enforcement of the statute has also been a factor justifying the conclusion that Congress intended
private parties to have a cause of action. See, e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 99 S. Ct. 1946,
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Jackson notion that sometimes the white resident is the "only effective
adversary" of unlawful housing discrimination. 101 In a situation like
Trafficante, current residents of an apartment complex may be in a better
position to challenge their landlord's discriminatory policies than minority
applicants. This is because the residents might have the greater "interest in
and knowledge of the situation over a period of time that is needed to
substantiate charges of . . .discriminatory real estate practices."
10 2
However, there is a basic distinction between Barrows and Trafficante on
this point. In Barrows, the white seller was permitted to overcome the
prudential limitations on standing and assert the interests of the black
homeseeker. In Trafficante, the plaintiffs were asserting their own interests
in interracial associations, and these interests were held sufficient to grant
them standing.
As in Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., the Trafficante plaintiffs
were not the only adversary of the unlawful discrimination-a number of
rejected black applicants had brought their own separate action against the
defendants.10 3 That a favorable decision in Trafficante might result in more
blacks living in the defendants' apartment complex was surely not
irrelevant to the plaintiffs' claim for integrated housing, but representing
these minorities was not the basis upon which the Court accorded the
plaintiffs standing. The plaintiffs' role as "private attorneys general" in
helping to enforce Title VIII was seen as a reflection of Congress' desire
that the plaintiffs' own interests in integration be recognized for standing
purposes, and not merely as a reason to permit them to overcome
prudential rules of standing in order to assert the rights of others.1
04
1962-63 (1979); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 556 (1969); Cf. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S.
66,74-77 (1975); Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412,419-21 (1975); National
R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453,462 n.9 (1974) (in which the
Court held Congress did not intend private parties to have a cause of action).
101. See note 44 and accompanying text supra.
102. Note, Racial Discrimination in the Private Housing Sector: Five Years After, 33 MD. L.
REv. 289, 311-12 (1973). See also Comment, supra note 79, at 571-72.
103. 446 F.2d at 1163 n.10.
104. See generally Scott, supra note 16, at 679-80. The distinction between asserting one's own
rights under Title VIII and being permitted to overcome the prudential rule against asserting the rights
of others under Title VIII turns out to have no practical significance as far as the Supreme Court is
concerned. See text accompanying notes 224-27 and 300-09 infra. In either case,
the standing question . . . is whether the . . . statutory provision on which the claim rests
properly can be understood as granting persons in the plaintiff's position a right to judicial
relief. . . .Congress may grant an express right of action to persons who otherwise would
be barred by prudential standing rules. . . . [S]o long as [the article III] requirement is
satisfied, persons to whom Congress has granted a right of action, either expressly or by clear
implication, may have standing to seek relief on the basis of the legal rights and interests of
others, and, indeed, may invoke the general public interest in support of their claim.
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,500-01 (1975). Thus, since Trafficante interpreted Title VIII as granting
persons in the plaintiffs' position a right to judicial relief, the plaintiffs had standing to sue regardless of
whether they were viewed as asserting their own rights or those of the minority homeseekers against
whom the defendants discriminated. See also Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 44 1 U.S. 91,
103 n.9 (1979).
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4. Statutory Standing and the Merits of a Claim Under Title VIII
Once it is determined that parties like the Trafficante plaintiffs have
statutory standing under Title VIII, the remaining question is whether this
also means that they have stated a valid claim under the statute. This
question, which Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc. raised with respect to
section 1982, further raises the issue whether there is any meaningful
difference between the concepts of a plaintiff's standing to sue and his right
to recover on the merits. Both are matters of statutory construction, 10 5 and
although the Trafficante opinion implies that the two concepts are
different,'" it seems to treat them as functional equivalents.
Because the Supreme Court has not yet decided a Title VIII case on
the merits, what constitutes a claim under the Fair Housing Act is not well
established. Presumably, however, there would be three basic elements to
such a claim: (1) that the defendant violated the statute; (2) that the
plaintiff was injured; and (3) that the defendant's violation caused the
plaintiff's injury.'0 7 There was no question in Trafficante that the
complaint alleged violations of Title VIII by the defendants. 10 8 The focus
of the case was on the plaintiffs' injuries. The Court held that the claim that
plaintiffs' had been deprived of the benefits of living in an integrated
community alleged one of the types of injuries that Title VIII was intended
to redress. Little was said about the causal link between the defendants'
discrimination and this injury, although the fact that black applicants had
actually applied and been discriminated against did suggest that "but for"
the defendants' discrimination, the apartment complex would have been
more integrated than it was.
Assuming that the plaintiffs would have been able to prove these
allegations at trial (and this, of course, must be assumed for purposes of
deciding a threshold motion to dismiss for lack of standing'0 9), the clear
implication of Trafficante is that these facts would entitle the plaintiffs to
recover on the merits."0 This is simply another way of saying that the
complaint is sufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 1 '
Thus, the Court's decision that the plaintiffs' injuries were sufficient for
105. See notes 80, 100, 104 supra.
106. 409 U.S. at 208 ("The District Court did not reach the merits but only held that petitioners
were not within the class of persons entitled to sue under the Act.").
107. See note 29 supra.
108. See 409 U.S. at 207-08.
109. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975).
110. See 409 U.S. at 209-10 ("What the proof may be is one thing; the alleged injury to existing
tenants by exclusion of minority persons from the apartment complex is the loss of important benefits
from interracial associations.").
Ill. In federal court, "a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would
entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). See also Hospital Bldg. Co. v.
Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 746 (1976).
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standing purposes under Title VIII seems also to decide that the plaintiffs
stated a substantive claim against the defendant under the statute.
11 2
If it is true that, under the Fair Housing Act, statutory standing is the
equivalent of having a meritorious claim, then the question arises why the
courts in Trafficante and in many other Title VIII cases have chosen to deal
with the issue of standing instead of simply trying to define what
constitutes a proper claim under the statute. One answer may be that
judicial experience in other statutory areas in which private suits are
significantly relied upon to enforce the law has often led to the
development of special standing rules that limit the class of appropriate
plaintiffs. For example, treble damage actions under section 4 of the
Clayton Antitrust Act" 3 may be brought only by those plaintiffs whose
injury is considered to be a "direct" result of the defendant's unlawful
activity; plaintiffs whose injuries are said to be "indirect," "remote,"
"consequential," "incidental," or "derivative" are held to lack standing." 4
This "direct injury" rule has the effect of adding an additional element to
the plaintiff's complaint beyond the basic substantive claim of his having
been injured by the defendant's antitrust violation. This antitrust standing
requirement was designed to reduce the broad class of persons who may
sue for a substantive violation. 1 5 The purpose of this additional
requirement is to avoid ruinous or duplicative recoveries in treble damage
actions that would be out of all proportion to the defendant's violation or
the enforcement policies of the antitrust laws."1
6
The Ninth Circuit's decision to deny standing to the Trafficante
plaintiffs on the ground that they were not the "direct object" or "direct
victims" of the defendants' discriminatory practices may have been
inspired by the direct injury rule of antitrust standing law."17 Such a rule
would have permitted only those who had been discriminated against by
the defendants to become plaintiffs and would have prevented the situation
in which any one of 8,200 apartment residents could sue for his loss of the
right to live in an integrated community.
While Trafficante does raise the specter of massive numbers of claims
112. See note 29 supra. "Nothing is gained by labeling Trafficante a standing case; the precedents
on which the Court relied emanated from a different area of the law. Trafficante simply decided that the
plaintiffs had stated a claim upon which relief could be granted." Tushnet, The New Law of Standing:
A Plea for Abandonment, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 663, 673 (1977).
113. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
114. See Berger & Bernstein, An Analytical Framework for Antitrust Standing, 86 YALE L.J.
809, 813 (1977).
115. Id. at 836.
116. Id. at 836,845-55. An additional value served by limiting antitrust standing to those directly
injured by the violation complained of is that the judicial system is spared the substantial time and
expense that would be taken up in hearing suits by indirect victims. See id. at 850 & n. 190, 858. But see
id. at 857 ("The allocation ofjudicial resources is more properly a matter of legislative competence and
prerogative. . . . [G]iven the inequities and impracticalities of balancing substantive claims against
administrative costs, courts would be well advised to avoid using standing determinations as cost-
cutting devices."). See generally Scott, supra note 16, at 676, 682.
117. 446 F.2d at 1162-64.
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arising out of a single violation, Title VIII cases generally do not involve
the danger of ruinous or duplicate recoveries that underlies limitations on
antitrust standing. The potential rewards for the fair housing plaintiff are
not nearly so great as they are for his antitrust counterpart. Treble
damages are not awarded under Title VIII, and there is a $1,000 limit on
punitive damages." 8 With rare exceptions, damage awards in fair housing
cases have been less than $15,000. 19 And if there is a danger that tenants in
the Trafficante-type claim may "collect too much," the problem can better
be dealt with by careful scrutiny of the proof at trial on the issues of
causation and the extent of injury to each individual plaintiff rather than
by summarily rejecting a class of potential plaintiffs as lacking standing. 120
Thus, the policy considerations that have given rise to the "direct injury"
requirement of antitrust standing generally do not apply in private housing
discrimination cases. 121 It was appropriate, therefore, for the Supreme
Court to reject the Ninth Circuit's attempt to add such a requirement to
Title VIII suits in Trafficante. It is important to recognize, however, that
without such a rule, a determination that the allegations of a complaint are
sufficient to give the plaintiff standing under Title VIII is the same as
holding that the complaint is sufficient as a matter of substantive law; that
is, the plaintiff is entitled to recover on the merits if he proves his
allegations at trial.
C. The Exclusionary Zoning Cases: Warth v. Seldin and Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.
1. Background and Holdings
The claims asserted in Warth v. Seldin122 and Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.123 were typical of
those made in a number of federal suits brought to challenge local land use
laws restricting low and moderate income housing. 124 Most of these cases
118. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1976). See generally Comment, supra note 79, at 572. This restriction
on punitive damages, however, does not apply to fair housing actions brought under § 1982. See, .g.,
Allen v. Gifford, 368 F. Supp. 317 (E.D. Va. 1973); Wright v. Kaine Realty, 352 F. Supp. 222 (N.D. Ill.
1972).
119. See, e.g., Marry. Rife, 545 F.2d 554 (6th Cir. 1976); Youngv. Parkland Village, Inc., 460 F.
Supp. 67,72 (D. Md. 1978) and cases cited therein; Williamson v. Hampton Management Co., 339 F.
Supp. 1146 (N.D. I11. 1972). For the exception that proves the rule, see Park View Heights Corp. v. City
of Black Jack, 605 F.2d 1033 (8th Cir. 1979) ($450,000 settlement of damage claims in Title VIII
action).
120. Cf. Berger & Bernstein, supra note 114, at 850-55 (discussion of courts' denying standing in
antitrust cases because of fear of duplicative, ruinous, windfall, or speculative recoveries).
121. But see text accompanying notes 192-93, 206-13, 282-86 infra.
122. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
123. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
124. See, e.g., Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126 (3rd Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 908 (1978); Joseph Skillken & Co. v. City of Toledo, 528 F.2d 867 (6th Cir. 1975), vacated and
remanded, 429 U.S. 1068 (1977) and558 F.2d 350 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 985 (1977); United
States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975); United
Farmworkers of Florida Hous. Project, Inc. v. City of Delray Beach, 493 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1974); Park
View Heights Corp. v. City of Black Jack, 467 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1972) and454 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.
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arose after 1968, when passage of the Housing and Urban Development
Act 25 greatly expanded federal programs for privately developed low
income housing. 126 The location of a particular subsidized housing project
was often a subject of controversy, and some communities blocked
proposed developments with an adverse zoning decision, restrictive
building code, or other techniques. In response, various types of plaintiffs,
armed with a variety of legal theories, sought judicial relief from these
restrictions.
27
Warth was the first of these exclusionary zoning cases to reach the
Supreme Court. It was unusual only in that it combined so many different
plaintiffs and legal theories and that it challenged a town's overall zoning
scheme instead of focusing on the rejection of a particular development.
Warth is also the only modern Supreme Court decision to deny standing in
a fair housing case.128 It is perhaps the Court's most important statement in
this field because it blocks so many different types of claims and because it
attempts to provide a theoretical framework for resolving standing
problems generally. In addition, the opinion by Justice Powell, who later
wrote the decisions in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Development Corp.'29 and Gladstone Realtors v. Village of
Bellwood, 30 marks the beginning of his emergence as the Court's principal
spokesman in this field.
Warth held that various organizations and individuals lacked
standing to challenge the exclusionary zoning ordinance of Penfield, New
York, an affluent suburb of Rochester. Penfield and certain of its
Mo. 1978); Crow v. Brown, 457 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1972); Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of
Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2nd Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971); Dailey v. City of
Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037(10th Cir. 1970); SASSO v. City of Union City, 424 F.2d 291(9th Cir. 1970). See
generally R. BABCOCK & F. BOSSELMAN, EXCLUSIONARY ZONING: LAND USE REGULATION AND
HOUSING IN THE 1970s (1973); D. MOSKOWITZ, EXCLUSIONARY ZONING LITIGATION (1977); NATIONAL
COMMITTEE AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING-URBAN LAND INSTITUTE, FAIR HOUSING &
EXCLUSIONARY ZONING (1974); Note, Developments in the Law-Zoning, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1427,
1624-708 (1978). A substantial amount of exclusionary zoning litigation has also taken place in state
courts. See, e.g., cases cited in Sager, supra note 14, at 1374 n.1; Note, Standing to Challenge
Exclusionary Land Use Devices in Federal Courts After Warth v. Seldin, 29 STAN. L. REV. 323,324-25
n.9 (1977).
125. Pub. L. 90-448, 82 Stat. 476 (1968) (amending National Housing Act of 1934, 12 U.S.C. §
1715(z) (1976)).
126. "The impact of the 1968 Housing and Urban Development Act can be appreciated by the
fact that more subsidized housing was produced in the four years 1968-1971 than had been produced in
the previous 36 years." NATIONAL COMMITTEE AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING-URBAN LAND
INSTITUTE, FAIR HOUSING & EXCLUSIONARY LAND USE 9 (1974). See also note 24 and accompanying
text supra.
127. For a list of some of the theories used to attack exclusionary land use decisions, see
Schwemm, supra note 73, at 201-02 n.21, 250-54.
128. For commentaries on standing to sue in exclusionary zoning cases, see Sager, supra note 14,
at 1373-40; Comment, Standing to Challenge Exclusionary Zoning in the Federal Courts, 17 B.C.
INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 347 (1976); Note, Standing to Challenge Exclusionary Land Use Devices in
Federal Courts After Warth v. Seldin, 29 STAN. L. REV. 323 (1977) and articles cited therein at 338 n.93,
349 n.171, 351 n.183.
129. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
130. 441 U.S. 91 (1979).
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municipal officials were accused of using their zoning powers to effectively
exclude minorities and low and moderate income persons from living in
the town. The complaint alleged violation of various constitutional and
statutory provisions, including the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment and section 1982. No claim under the Fair Housing Act
was made. 131 The plaintiffs and prospective intervenors fell into four
categories: (1) low and moderate income minorities who were among
those excluded from Penfield; (2) an organization representing current
residents of Penfield who claimed that they were deprived of the benefits of
living in an integrated community; (3) two groups of home builders whose
members were allegedly blocked in their efforts to build low and moderate
income housing in Penfield; and (4) Rochester taxpayers who complained
that Penfield's refusal to accept some of the area's low and moderate
income persons forced Rochester to provide housing for them, which had
the effect of increasing the taxes paid by Rochester citizens. In a complaint
that ran over thirty pages, the original plaintiffs sought declaratory and
injunctive relief and $750,000 in actual and exemplary damages. The home
builders' complaint in intervention sought similar equitable relief and also
included a damage claim of $750,000. By a 5-4 vote, the Supreme Court
held that none of these claims was sufficient to give any of the plaintiffs
standing to sue.
In Arlington Heights, Metropolitan Housing Development Corpora-
tion (MHDC) proposed to build a federally subsidized apartment
development for low and moderate income tenants in an affluent and
virtually all-white Chicago suburb. The site chosen for the development
was vacant, but zoned for single family purposes. MHDC petitioned the
Village of Arlington Heights for rezoning in 1971. After many lengthy and
emotional public hearings that included discussion of whether racially
integrated housing was desirable in Arlington Heights, the village denied
the petition. MHDC and three black prospective tenants then sued the
village and its corporate officials in federal court. Plaintiffs alleged
violations of the equal protection clause, Title VIII, and section 1982, and
sought to have Arlington Heights enjoined from interfering with the
proposed development.
132
After a trial on the merits, the district court denied relief, holding that
the refusal to rezone had been motivated by legitimate zoning con-
siderations and not by racial discrimination.'3 3 The Seventh Circuit
131. 422 U.S. at 513. There was some question about whether the complaints should have been
read to allege a claim under Title VIII, but the plaintiffs did not pursue this issue in the Supreme Court,
and the Court treated the case as if Title VIII were not an issue. See id. at 513 n.21.
132. Prior to trial, a Mexican-American individual and an organization representing low and
moderate income persons in the Arlington Heights area were permitted to intervene as plaintiffs. 429
U.S. at 258-59. Like the Warth plaintiffs, the individual plaintiffs in Arlington Heights sought to
maintain their suit as a class action, but the district court declined to certify the class. Id. at 258 n.3. See
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 493-94 n.l.
133. 373 F. Supp. 208 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
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reversed.134 It reasoned that because the class of low and moderate income
people who were adversely affected by the village's decision included a
much larger percentage of blacks (forty percent) than did the area's overall
population (eighteen percent), the village's decision had a discriminatory
effect and would perpetuate Arlington Heights' highly segregated
residential patterns. Because the defendants failed to show any compelling
reason to justify their decision, the court of appeals held that the decision
violated the equal protection clause. The Supreme Court reversed, holding
that, under its recent decision in Washington v. Davis,135 an equal
protection violation required proof of discriminatory purpose, not just
discriminatory effect. The Court found that the Arlington Heights
plaintiffs had "simply failed to carry their burden of proving . . . dis-
criminatory purpose.' ' 36 Because the court of appeals had not addressed
the plaintiffs' claims under the Fair Housing Act, the Supreme Court
remanded the case for a decision on whether the defendants' refusal to
rezone violated Title VIII.
37
Before reaching the merits in Arlington Heights, Justice Powell,
writing for the Court, considered whether the plaintiffs had standing to
sue. He discussed the question of MHDC's standing at some length before
concluding that it need not be decided because at least one of MHDC's
black prospective tenants, a Mr. Ransom, had demonstrated standing. 38
Ransom worked in Arlington Heights and had testified that he would
probably move to the MHDC development if it were built. The Court
stated that Ransom asserted as an injury that "his quest for housing nearer
his employment ha[d] been thwarted by official action that [was] racially
discriminatory."'139 Distinguishing Warth, Justice Powell found that there
was at least a "substantial probability" that the judicial relief sought by this
plaintiff would result in construction of the development, "affording
Ransom the housing opportunity he desire[d]."' 140
A few preliminary observations about the Supreme Court's handling
of the standing issue in Arlington Heights are necessary. First, the
structure of the opinion indicates that the Court felt that there was a clear
134. 517 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1975).
135. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
136. 429 U.S. at 270.
137. On remand, the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed its earlier finding that Arlington Heights' refusal
to rezone had a racially discriminatory effect and held that this effect would suffice to establish a
violation of Title VIII ifno other suitable land was available in the village for the M H DC development.
558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978). The court of appeals remanded the
case to the district court for a determination whether alternative sites existed. Id. The parties then
reached a settlement agreement that provided for construction of the development at a different
location in Arlington Heights, and this settlement was approved by the trial judge over the objections
of a neighboring town and its residents. See Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington
Heights, 469 F. Supp. 836 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
138. 429 U.S. at 261-64.
139. Id. at 264.
140. Id. But see text accompanying notes 175-83 infra; Sager, supra note 14, at 1384-85.
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distinction between the standard of proof for judging a housing
discrimination claim under the fourteenth amendment and the question of
one's standing to assert such a claim under article III: plaintiff Ransom was
held to have a sufficient personal stake in this case to have standing, but his
proof of discriminatory effect was inadequate to make out an equal pro-
tection violation on the merits. Second, even though the defendants may
not have raised the standing issue below, the Court felt compelled to
consider it because "our jurisdiction to decide the case is implicated.' a41
Thus, unlike a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a motion to
dismiss for lack of standing under article III may be made at any time, even
after trial. 42 Third, the Court's determination in Arlington Heights to
reach the merits because "at least one" plaintiff had standing indicates that,
in a case with multiple plaintiffs, only one plaintiff is required to have
standing for a court to proceed. This means that decisions recognizing
standing in many different plaintiffs in the same case may be called into
question as precedents, because they unnecessarily passed on the question
of each plaintiff's standing when one would have been enough. 43 Finally,
Arlington Heights is the only modem housing discrimination decision of
the Supreme Court to consider standing issues after trial. Theoretically,
consideration of standing issues subsequent to a trial on the merits should
not improve the plaintiff's position, because his claim is supposed to be
taken as true when standing is addressed as a "threshold question.'' 144 It
may be, however, that the nature of the plaintiff's injury can be better
understood and appreciated after the facts have been fully developed
through a trial. 45 In this respect, Arlington Heights is typical of the fact
that a plaintiff's standing problem is for all practical purposes resolved in
his favor once he reaches trial.146 But, to the extent that the standing
requirement is seen as a way to reduce heavy court workloads, 147 its
justification loses much of its force once a trial has been held.
Although the Warth and Arlington Heights claims arose in a
somewhat different context from those presented to the Supreme Court in
141. 429 U.S. at 260, citing Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969).
142. See note 53 supra. Cf Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 193-94 (1976) (failure to raise
prudential standing problems below means that they may be disregarded on appeal). The Arlington
Heights view of article III standing as an unwaivable matter of jurisdiction suggests that this issue is
present at least implicitly in every case in federal court. Thus, a decision on the merits may be
understood as a ruling that the plaintiff has standing, even if nothing is said about standing.
143. See Village of Bellwood v. Gladstone Realtors, 569 F.2d 1013, 1018 (7th Cir. 1978), aff'd,
441 U.S. 91 (1979); and text accompanying notes 313-18 infra.
144. E.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 501 (1975). See City of Hartford v. Town of
Glastonbury, 561 F.2d 1048, 1051 (2nd Cir. 1977) (en banc), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1978).
145. See Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 109-16 (1979); Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490, 519 (1975) (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 526-27 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
146. But see City of Hartford v. Town of Glastonbury, 561 F.2d 1048 (2nd Cir. 1977) (en banc),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1978); Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976). These decisions are criticized in Sager, supra note 14, at
1393-98.
147. See note 116 supra.
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Sullivan and Trafficante, there are important sirhilarities in the types of
plaintiffs involved. The low income plaintiffs in the exclusionary zoning
cases, like the black tenant in Sullivan, claimed that their opportunity to
obtain suitable housing had been interfered with because of their race.
MHDC and the home builders in Warth, like the white lessor in Sullivan,
claimed they were blocked in their efforts to provide housing to minorities.
Likewise, the local residents who sued their own town in Warth specifically
based their claim on Trafficante's recognition of the right to live in an
integrated community.14 Each of these three classes of plaintiffs in the
exclusionary zoning cases-minority homeseekers, home builders, and
local residents-presents important standing problems that must be dealt
with individually.
2. The Minority Homeseekers: The Causation, Pleading,
and Specific Project Requirements
The low and moderate income plaintiffs in Warth were all members of
racial and ethnic minorities. They claimed that as a result of the
defendants' exclusionary zoning practices, they were unable to find
suitable housing in Penfield and consequently lived in substandard
housing, they received poorer municipal services, and they incurred higher
expenses in commuting to work. 14 9 These allegations were supplemented
by detailed affidavits of the individual plaintiffs. 50 Nevertheless, Warth
held that these facts were insufficient to meet the basic article III
requirements of standing, because they "fail[ed] to support an actionable
causal relationship between Penfield's zoning practices and petitioners'
asserted injury."' 5' It is the causation requirement between the defendant's
actions and the plaintiff's injury and, more particularly, Justice Powell's
rather harsh application of this requirement that distinguishes Warth from
other housing discrimination cases in the Supreme Court. Never before
had the Court held that the personal stake requirement of article III meant
that a minority homeseeker must establish at the pleading stage that "in
fact, the asserted injury was the consequence of the defendants' actions, or
that prospective relief will remove the harm."'
152
Another unusual aspect of Warth was how the Court defined the
148. Only the Rochester taxpayers in Warth had no clear precedent for their claim, and their
claim is the only one that is easily disposed of. Justice Powell's opinion, which termed the taxpayers'
asserted injuries "conjectural," considered the line of causation between Penfield's actions and the
higher taxes in Rochester little more than "an ingenious academic exercise in the conceivable," and
held that these plaintiffs were really trying to assert the rights of the excluded minority homeseekers,
which the prudential rules of standing prohibited. 422 U.S. at 509-10. The Court's conclusion that the
Rochester taxpayers were not proper plaintiffs was not challenged by either dissenting opinion in
Warth.
149. 422 U.S. at 493-96, 503. See also id. at 522-24 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
150. See id. at 503-04 nn.13, 14, 506 n.16. See also id. at 524-25 nn.3, 4, 527 n.7 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Because the district court had dismissed their complaint short of trial, the plaintiffs' claims
in all of these "extensive supportive materials" were assumed to be true. Id. at 501.
151. Id. at 507.
152. Id. at 505. See L. TRIBE, supra note 14, at 92-97.
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plaintiffs' injury. Justice Powell's opinion identified the "asserted injury"
or "harm" as the "inability to reside in Penfield,""' and not the racial
barriers to moving there that the defendants' zoning ordinance had
erected. Certainly, the plaintiffs' ultimate goal in Warth was to live in
Penfield, but the purpose of this litigation was to remove the zoning
barriers that blocked their path as an intermediate, but necessary, step on
their road to securing housing. 154 The Warth standard of causation-that
the allegations must establish a "substantial probability" that the plaintiffs
would be able to live in Penfield absent the defendants' restrictive zoning
practices'155-- bviously depends crucially on how the Court defines the
plaintiffs' injury. Specifically, if the harm is seen as actually being deprived
of housing, as it was in Warth, the causation requirement of article III
standing will be much more difficult to meet than if the injury is viewed
simply as unlawful racial barriers that may limit the plaintiff's housing
opportunities.
Another preliminary point about the Warth causation requirement is
that it is a radical departure from the normal rules of pleading in federal
court. Generally a federal complaint is considered sufficient if it simply
gives the defendant "fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is.' 56 To this
end, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a complaint contain
only a "short and plain statement" of the grounds for the court's
jurisdiction, of the claim, and of the relief demanded.5 7 With respect to
causation, "the simplicity and brevity which the rules contemplate' 5' are
indicated by Form 9, the model negligence complaint, which merely pleads
that "[a]s a result" of defendant's negligence, plaintiff was injured in certain
ways. 59 This complaint is "sufficient under the rules."'
160
The minority plaintiffs in Warth did allege that "as a result" of
Penfield's exclusionary scheme, they could not live in the town. 161
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that the causation allegations in
Warth were inadequate. The thrust of the Court's opinion is that "further
particularized allegations of fact .. . supportive of plaintiff's stan-
ding"162 must be supplied. The Court's causation requirement was not
satisfied by simply including the "as a result" language in the complaint.
This is understandable. If standing is to have any practical meaning as a
153. 422 U.S. at 506. See also id. at 503-05.
154. See Sager, supra note 14, at 1385-88.
155. 422 U.S. at 504.
156. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). See generally C. CLARK, SIMPLIFIED PLEADINr, 2
F.R.D. 456 (1943).
157. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
158. FED. R. Civ. P. 84.
159. 28 U.S.C.A. Form 9 (1970) (Appendix of Forms, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
160. FED. R. Civ. P. 84.
161. See 422 U.S. at 522-52 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
162. Id.; see also id. at 504, 508. But cf. United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 689-90 n.15
(1973) (defendants' claim that plaintiffs had failed to make sufficiently specific allegations could have
been resolved by a FED. R. Civ. P. 12(e) motion for a more definite statement).
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threshold requirement, it should not be possible for every plaintiff to
overcome this hurdle merely by parroting a three-word phrase. As Justice
Powell noted in another part of Warth, "pleadings must be something
more than an ingenious academic exercise in the conceivable."'
163
But the Warth plaintiffs did not simply rely on their "as a result" claim
to establish causation. Their complaint and extensive supporting materials
alleged facts that established a clear causal chain between their inability to
live in Penfield and the defendants' exclusionary zoning practice.
164
Warth simply cannot be understood as a case of inadequate pleading,
if the normal rules of pleading apply. 65 Indeed, if the complaint in Warth
could be criticized on pleading grounds alone, it would be because it lacked
the "simplicity and brevity" required by the Rules166 and not because of
insufficient allegations. The unmistakable impression produced by Warth
is that no matter how the complaint was drafted, on the basis of the facts
available the majority would have found it inadequate. 67 Justice Powell's
opinion to the contrary notwithstanding, additional factual allegations
would not have helped. The Court had sufficient specific, concrete facts. It
simply held as a matter of law that the facts of this case did not establish the
plaintiffs' standing.
The missing factual allegation that most troubled Justice Powell in
Warth was that no current plans existed to build housing in Penfield that
would -meet the plaintiffs' needs. Specific projects had been proposed and
blocked by the defendants in the past, but the complaint referred to no
planned development that was currently being precluded by the Penfield
zoning ordinance. 68 The significance of this fact was emphasized by the
Court's apparent approval of a number of lower court cases in which
plaintiffs had been permitted to challenge zoning restrictions "applied to
particular projects that would supply housing within their means, and of
which they were intended residents. The plaintiffs [in these cases] thus were
able to demonstrate that unless relief from assertedly illegal actions was
163. 422 U.S. at 509, quoting United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 688 (1973).
164. The chain of causation alleged in Warth had three links (1) Penfield's zoning laws, which
were intentionally adopted to exclude low and moderate income persons and minority groups,
substantially contributed to the high cost of housing in Penfield,see422 U.S. at495-96, 502-04; (2) were
it not for these unlawful restrictions, low and moderate housing would be available in Penfield, see id.
at 529-30 (Brennan, J., dissenting); and (3) the named plaintiffs, as low and moderate income minorities
seeking to reside in Penfield, would likely live in this housing. Id. at 527 n.7. This is a good deal more
than "an ingenious academic exercise in the conceivable." Id. at 509. The chain makes a complete
causal connection between Penfield's zoning practices and the plaintiffs' inability to live there. See
Sager, supra note 14, at 1382-83. The Supreme Court may have been "doubtful" about some of these
allegations, see 422 U.S. at 506 n. 16; but see id. at 501-02, but they were in fact made, and it is hard to
see how they could have been made with much more particularity. See Sager, supra note 14, at 1383.
165. See Sager, supra note 14, at 1383-84.
166. FED. R. Civ. P. 84. See also FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a); and authorities cited in note 156 supra.
167. See Sager, supra note 14, at 1383-84.
168. 422 U.S. at 505-06 & nn.15-16, 516. The Court found it "doubtful" that the minority
plaintiffs would be able to qualify for the one project that was apparently still under consideration. Id.
at 506 n.16.
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forthcoming, their immediate and personal interests would be harmed.' ' 69
On the other hand, without a current project under consideration, Warth
held that there was only a "remote possibility" that the plaintiffs' situation
would be improved if the Penfield ordinance were struck down.170 While
Justice Powell did not say that standing would never be possible without a
specific development for which the plaintiffs would qualify, he did
conclude that "usually the initial focus should be on a particular
project."'17 1 Indeed, it was the existence of a particular project two years
later in Arlington Heights that led the Court to distinguish Warth and to
conclude that the excluded minority homeseeker there had "adequately
averred an 'actionable causal relationship' between Arlington Heights'
zoning practices and his asserted injury."'172
The Supreme Court's emphasis in Warth and Arlington Heights of
the need for a specific project to confer standing on individual homeseekers
in exclusionary zoning cases has been widely criticized.173 The result seems
to create a "Catch-22" in which, as Justice Brennan's dissent in Warth put
it, "the Court turns the very success of the allegedly unconstitutional
scheme into a barrier to a lawsuit seeking its invalidation."'174 So long as
Penfield's zoning restrictions successfully inhibit builders from going
forward with the expense and inconvenience of planning a specific project
that is certain to be blocked by the town, minority homeseekers are
prevented from initiating a challenge to those restrictions.
What purpose is served by the Warth-Arlington Heights requirements
that a specific housing development be proposed? Both dissents in Warth
accused the majority of being hostile to the plaintiffs' claim on the
169. Id. at 507. See cases cited id. n.17.
170. Id at 507. But see note 154 and accompanying text supra.
171. 422 U.S. at 508 n.18.
172. 429 U.S. 252, 264 (1977). See Sager, supra note 14, at 1384-88. In matters of pleading, a
plaintiff in a case like Warth could conceivably include an allegation that a current project existed,just
to avoid a pretrial motion to dismiss. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(e) (2). But see FED. R. Civ. P. 11. Of course,
if the plaintiff must allege something he cannot prove, the trial will presumably result in a judgment
against him, and whether this judgment is based on lack of standing or on some other ground may seem
unimportant. But see notes 48,49, 53 supra. This scenario suggests one of the reasons why Warth might
encourage defendants to raise the standing problem as a threshold matter in all fair housing cases in
which the issue is even the least bit in doubt. Nothing is lost by the motion, and, by way of response, the
plaintiff may be forced to produce a more thorough set of allegations than the original complaint
included. E-g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501-02 (1975). The plaintiff's entire legal theory and, in
particular, his proof of the causal link between his injury and the defendant's alleged violation may
have to be revealed early in the litigation. Indeed, the plaintiff may feel compelled to claim a degree of
specificity in his proof that he will be unable to back up at trial. Purely as a matter ofstrategy, therefore,
the motion to dismiss for lack of standing can produce substantial information for the defendant and
may lock the plaintiff into a difficult legal theory for trial purposes. It is little wonder, then, that this
motion has become a popular part of the defense lawyer's arsenal in fair housing cases. But see note 331
infra.
173. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 14, at 96-97 ("[O]ne can only regard as aberrational in the
extreme the decision in Warth v. Seldin. . . .Nothing in article III, in the canons of sound judicial
administration, or in thejudicial precedents, required so harsh and bizarre a result."); Sager, supra note
14, at 1382-85.
174. 422 U.S. at 523 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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merits.'75 However, if the Court were indeed bent on preventing "every
conceivable kind of plaintiff" from bringing an exclusionary zoning suit,176
why has it encouraged the specific project cases to continue?
Professor Sager has suggested that the justification for the
requirement of a particular housing project "might lie in the perception
that where a specific project is at issue, there is a greater probability of the
individual plaintiffs' actually securing improved housing as a result of
prevailing in their litigation."'177 There is some support for this suggestion
in the Arlington Heights opinion, in which Justice Powell found a
"substantial probability" that a plaintiffs' victory would result in the
construction of the MHDC development and that this in turn would
"[afford] Ransom the housing opportunity he desires."'178 This view of the
facts, however, is overly simplistic. For example, even if the zoning
restrictions were removed, MHDC's ability to finance the project under
the federal subsidy programs then available seemed doubtful. 79 And even
if the development were ultimately built, Ransom would have to compete
with the thousands of other low and moderate income persons in the area
for one of its 190 apartments. Thus, while a favorable decision in Arlington
Heights would have removed one of the barriers from the builder's path (as
it would have done in Warth as well), 80 it is hard to say whether this would
have "substantially" increased Ransom's probability of securing the
housing he desired.
The ultimate significance of the MHDC proposal, then, was not that it
so significantly increased Ransom's likelihood of living in Arlington
Heights, but that it led the Supreme Court to define his injury more
generously than it was willing to do for the minority homeseekers in
Warth. Whereas the plaintiffs' claim in Warth was seen as "inability to
reside in Penfield,"' 8' the Court in Arlington Heights saw Ransom's claim
to be that his "quest" for suitable housing-specifically for the MHDC
project-had been "thwarted."'' 82 He was given standing to challenge any
175. 422 U.S. at 518 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 520 (Brennan, J., dissenting). There maybe
something to this charge. The same five justices who made up the majority in Warth (Burger, Stewart,
Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist) were also the only ones to find for the defendants on the merits in
Arlington Heights.
176. See 422 U.S. at 520 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
177. Sager, supra note 14, at 1384.
178. 429 U.S. at 264.
179. Id. at 261 & n.7. See also Sager, supra note 14, at 1384-85:
When specific project lawsuits are decided in the plaintiffs' favor, it by no means follows that
the projects will in fact be constructed. These suits generally do not reach a final judgment in
less than two years, and often take a good deal longer . . . [The Arlington Heights litigation
recently began its 9th year]; rising construction costs, flagging developer enthusiasm and
other incidents of the delay and cost of litigation are quite likely to handicap completion of
the project. The postlitigation record of [actually constructing] these projects is thus dismal.
Professor Sager concludes that it is unclear whetherspecific project cases are likely actually to produce
more housing than challenges to exclusionary zoning ordinances like Warth would. Id. at 1385.
180. See note 154 and accompanying text supra.
181. 422 U.S. at 506. See also id. at 503-05.
182. 429 U.S. at 254.
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significant barrier that blocked this quest on racial grounds, even if its
removal would not guarantee that his search would be successful." 3 This
distinction is in line with the Court's approach in Sullivan, in which the
black homeseeker was permitted to sue those who had interfered with his
landlord's attempt to lease to him. The right of minorities to secure
housing has always depended on the willingness of developers, landlords,
and other suppliers to make housing available to them. If the suppliers are
willing and if their efforts are blocked by third parties on the basis of the
race of the potential occupants, Sullivan and Arlington Heights indicate
that minority homeseekers have standing to challenge these obstacles in
order to increase their chances of obtaining the housing they desire.
1 84
To say that the Supreme Court is more sympathetic in defining the
minority homeseeker's injury when a specific housing unit or development
is involved, however, is not to explain the reason for this distinction or to
justify its existence. The only purpose that appears to be served by the
Court's insistence on a particular project in exclusionary zoning cases is
that some limit is placed on what otherwise would be a huge number of
potential claims. The specter of every affluent suburb in the nation having
its zoning ordinance or building code subjected to claims by all of the area's
low and moderate income minorities is even more sobering than the
potential 8,200 suits by the individual apartment residents in Trafficante.
The problem of too many potential plaintiffs in cases like Warth
should be recognized as including two separate concerns: (1) that the
plaintiffs as a class might be entitled to "too much" relief; and (2) that
authorizing suits by all of the plaintiffs would overwhelm the municipal
defendants and the available judicial resources. The first concern seems
rather minor, so long as the principal relief sought is simply an injunction
against enforcement of the zoning ordinance being challenged. Whether it
is certified as a class action or not,'85 an exclusionary zoning case seeking
purely equitable relief is essentially brought on behalf of all similarly-
situated minority homeseekers. One successful case would satisfy all, and
one would be all that is necessary.186 Thus, if the concern in Warth was that
183. See notes 154, 179 and accompanying text supra.
184. See L. TRIBE, supra note 14, at 95-96. Professor Tribe's phrase for the injury in such cases is
"constricted housing opportunity," and he concludes that this injury is certainly more personal and
palpable than the one held sufficient for article III purposes in United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669
(1973). L. TRIBE, supra note 14, at 96 n.18.
185. Compare Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,493 n.1 (1975) (claim treated as a class action) with
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 258 n.3 (1977) (trial
court refused to certify claim as a class action).
186. In theory, the matter is more complicated if substantial money damages are sought, as they
were in Warth. The fear would be that to recognize a damage claim against Penfield in every poor black
homeseeker in the Rochester area would encourage duplicative and speculative claims and would
threaten the town with a potentially ruinous total award. Nothing was made of the individuals' damage
claim in Warth, however, and successful exclusionary zoning cases generally have not resulted in
damage awards to the minority homeseekers. But see Park View Heights Corp. v. City of Black Jack,
605 F.2d 1033 (8th Cir. 1979) ($450,000 settlement obtained by builder in exclusionary zoning suit). If
damages ever do become a significant factor in these cases, a better way to control them would be to
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recognizing standing would authorize too many plaintiffs to bring similar
claims, it was a concern primarily for the towns that would have to defend
against them and for the courts that would have to hear them.
1 87
The one clear result of the Warth-Arlington Heights requirement that
a specific development first be proposed by a housing builder is that it
insures that the federal courts will not be overwhelmed by exclusionary
zoning claims.188 While this concern is not made explicit in Warth or
Arlington Heights, Justice Powell's opinions do refer to it obliquely. In
Arlington Heights Justice Powell cited Schlesinger v. Reservists
Committee to Stop the War'89 in support of his conclusion that "[t]he
specific project MHDC intends to build .. .provides that 'essential
dimension of specificity' that informs judicial decisionmaking."' 90
Schlesinger denied standing to enforce a constitutional guarantee to
plaintiffs who sued in their capacity as United States citizens, because the
Court felt that their interest was" 'undifferentiated' from that of all other
citizens."' 9' Although the Court has acknowledged that standing is not to
be denied simply because "many persons shared the same injury,' 92 the
Court in Schlesinger found that the citizen plaintiffs' interest in
constitutional governance was not "peculiar" to them and was too
"generalized" to give them standing. The problem with "citizen standing,"
according to Schlesinger, is that it "has no boundaries" and could lead to
"government by injunction," with the courts being asked to review every
possible governmental action.
93
The Schlesinger opinion gave two reasons for the requirement that
require strict proof of individual injury and causation as elements of the claim on the merits rather than
to reject these claims outright on standing grounds. See note 120 and accompanying text supra, and
text accompanying notes 215-16, 285-309.
187. The towns, however, may still be subject to these claims in state court. See note 188 nfra.
And, as far as the federal courts are concerned, there is always the question whether their burdens
might not actually be eased more by expanding the scope of standing rather than by narrowing it. As
Professor Davis has argued, "opening the doors to anyone'injured in fact' will not appreciably increase
the number of parties who seek to litigate. It will cause an enormous drop in the huge volume of
litigation in the federal courts about the complexities of the law of standing." Davis, The Liberalized
Law of Standing, 37 U. Cm. L. REv. 450, 471 (1970).
188. See notes 116-20 and accompanying text supra. Since state courts are not subject to the
standing limitations imposed by article III, they remain free to hear Warth-type challenges to
exclusionary zoning practices that do not relate to a specific project. See notes 48-49 supra. See
generally Sager, supra note 14, at 1389-92, 1400-02.
189. 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
190. 429 U.S. at 263.
191. 418 U.S. at 217.
192. United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 686 (1973).
193. 418 U.S. at 222,227. See generally Scott,supra note 16, at 683-90 Schlesinger is not directly
applicable to the claims of the minority plaintiffs in Warth, because these claims were not shared by
every citizen in the country. The Warth plaintiffs lived in the Rochester area and had worked and
sought housing in Penfield, much as Ransom had done with respect to Arlington Heights. Because the
Court viewed their injury as an "inability to reside in Penfield,"422 U.S. at 506, there were thousands of
other low and moderate income minorities who also could have made the same claim. However, the
Warth claims would have some boundaries in terms of the number of potential plaintiffs who could
assert them. Therefore, the number of potential plaintiffs in Warth-type suits is still much more limited
than in the pure citizen standing case. See generally Scott, supra note 16, at 652.
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injuries be concrete and particular to the plaintiffs asserting them: (1) the
complainant would be able to present a "complete perspective" of the case
to the court; and (2) judicial power would not be exercised unnecessari-
ly.'94 It is the first of these to which Justice Powell was referring when he
concluded in Arlington Heights that a specific project in an exclusionary
zoning case would "provide that 'essential dimension of specificity' that
informs judicial decisionmaking."' 95
The basis for this conclusion is not at all obvious. Thejustification for
article III's requirement of a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy is to ensure that the case will be presented in an adversary
context. 96 If anything is apparent from Warth and Arlington Heights,
however, it is that standing does not turn on the plaintiff's actual ability to
present his case vigorously and effectively. In Arlington Heights, for
example, the real adversary of the defendants' zoning decision-that is, the
only plaintiff with the interest, resources, and will to fight a decade-long
battle for subsidized housing to be built in Arlington Heights-was the
corporate builder, not the individual black homeseeker. Nevertheless, the
Court recognized standing in Ransom, who was just one of thousands of
poor minority members who could have been selected as a named plaintiff.
By so doing, it left MHDC's standing in doubt. Furthermore, the minority
homeseekers in Warth appear to be as worthy adversaries of the Penfield
zoning ordinance as Ransom was against Arlington Heights' decision to
block the MHDC project. The Warth plaintiffs showed every sign of being
prepared to fight long and hard. They surely would have presented the case
in an adversary context if the Court had permitted them to do so. Indeed,
one of the great ironies of Warth, or any other adverse standing decision
for that matter, is that the parties fight tooth and nail all the way to the
United States Supreme Court over the issue of whether the plaintiff's stake
in the litigation is sufficient to ensure that there will be an adversary
proceeding. Then the Court finally concludes that the plaintiff is not
adequately interested in the case. 197
194. 418 U.S. at 220-22.
195. 429 U.S. at 263, quoting Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208,
221 (1974).
196. E.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968).
197. Of course, the Supreme Court has made clear that the adversary requirement means more
than the ability to vigorously press one's claim. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). See also
Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208,225-27 (1974). Ifthis were the measure
of standing, poor black individuals would rarely be considered proper plaintiffs in a major
discrimination case, and well-financed organizations represented by lawyers heavily "committed" to
their cause would never be challenged on standing grounds. Obviously, the black homeseeker has
standing in a case like Arlington Heights not because of his individual power, but because of the nature
of his injury. The question remains, however, why the existence of a specific project makes Ransom's
interest so much more particularized and his ability to present the court with a complete adversary
perspective so much more effective than the Warth plaintiffs. The existence of a specific project might
indicate a greater likelihood of the plaintiffs' actually securing housing as a result of the suit, which
presumably would heighten their incentive to win. As noted above, see note 179 and accompanying text
supra, however, this is unlikely to be true, although the Supreme Court, inexperienced in exclusionary
7oning cases until Warth and Arlington Heights, might have believed that it was.
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The Court's second reason in Schlesinger for rejecting generalized
injury cases-to avoid needless exercises ofjudicial power-also seemed to
concern the Supreme Court in Warth. The Warth opinion includes a
statement of general principles about standing, which begins with Justice
Powell's conviction that standing "is founded in concern about the
proper-and properly limited-role of courts in a democratic society.'
198
Later, in his discussion about the need to focus on a particular housing
project, Justice Powell noted that "zoning laws . . . are peculiarly within
the province of state and local legislative authorities."'199 He suggested that
citizens dissatisfied with these laws might avail themselves of "the normal
democratic process" instead of judicial review. 200 This suggestion is
nothing short of incredible. The minority homeseekers in Warth, because
they did not live in Penfield, had no way of participating in the Penfield
democratic process. Indeed, their complaint was that this very process had
resulted in a zoning ordinance intentionally designed to make sure that
they never did become residents of Penfield. Nevertheless, one of the
lessons of Warth is that in exclusionary zoning cases and other housing
discrimination suits against state and local governments, an additional
standing concern based on the "proper-and properly limited-role of the
courts in a democratic society' 20' is present which does not arise in cases
against private defendants like Sullivan and Trafficante.
What was considered determinative in Warth and Arlington Heights,
however, was not the presence of a municipal defendant, but the absence of
a specific project. Federal courts may now hear exclusionary zoning suits,
but only when the existence of a current housing proposal serves to limit
the controversy to a particular development in a particular town for a
particular group of prospective residents who qualify for it and want to live
there. As in Trafficante, in which the injury claimed was shared by 8,200
identifiable tenants, the requirement of a particular project may still permit
suit on behalf of large numbers of plaintiffs. However, there will at least be
something about the case that will help to identify who these potential
claimants are. The requirement that a plaintiff be able to allege injuries that
set him apart from the general public underlies Schlesinger as well as the
exclusionary zoning cases. If potential claimants can be identified
individually by their interest in and eligibility for a specific project, then
the problem of limitless standing can be avoided.
To return for a moment to the form negligence complaint in which "as
198. 422 U.S. at 498, citing Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208
(1974).
199. 422 U.S. at 508 n.18.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 498. This additional standing concern is not directed to state courts. See id. and note
188 supra. Thus, some commentators have read Warth not as being hostile to attacks on exclusionary
zoning ordinances per se, but as determining that judicial review of such ordinances should occur in
state, rather than federal, courts. See Sager, supra note 14, at 1390-92, and articles cited therein at 1390
n.55.
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a result" suffices to allege causation, the only apparent distinctions
between this claim and a similar allegation in an exclusionary zoning suit
are: (1) hundreds of years of judicial experience in dealing with these types
of cases and the injuries they entail; and (2) the fact that the very act of
negligence alleged serves to single out a particular victim or class of victims
as potential plaintiffs. Just as the negligent act triggers the claim and
identifies the plaintiff, a current housing proposal is now necessary to
initiate an exclusionary zoning suit in federal court. Without this tangible
event, low and moderate income minorities cannot be marshalled to
challenge a suburban zoning ordinance. If the Supreme Court in Warth
was indeed hostile to the plaintiffs' claim, perhaps this hostility was
directed at the fact of bringing together so many individuals and
organizations as plaintiffs, which made the case seem like a lawyer's
creation, not a spontaneous reaction to a definite event. In view of the
plaintiffs' specific focus on seeking housing in Penfield, it may not have
been appropriate for the Warth Court to deny them standing on the basis
of Schlesinger-type concerns. 02 However, those concerns are the only
explanation available for the Court's "specific project" approach as a
requirement of article III standing for minority homeseekers in
exclusionary zoning cases.
3. Home Builders: Organizational Plaintiffs, the Importance
of the Relief Sought, and the "Direct Target" Concept
In both Warth and Arlington Heights, the Supreme Court considered
the standing of home builders to challenge zoning restrictions that
prohibited their development of low and moderate income housing. Once
again, the key to standing was the existence of a specific, current project.
Without such a project, the home builders in Warth were denied standing;
with it, MHDC was held to have met the constitutional requirements of
standing in Arlington Heights.
Warth was complicated somewhat by the fact that the plaintiffs were
two housing associations, not the individual builders. The Rochester
Home Builders Association, an organization of area construction firms
whose members had been responsible for most of the private housing
developed in Penfield in recent years, claimed that the defendants' zoning
ordinance prevented its members from building low and moderate cost
housing in Penfield and thereby deprived them of "substantial business
opportunities and profits. '20 3 A second association, the Housing Council
in the Monroe County Area, Inc., consisted of seventy-one organizations
interested in housing problems. It included seventeen home builders who
were or hoped to be active in the development of low and moderate cost
housing in Penfield.2 °4 Neither Home Builders nor Housing Council as-
202. See note 193 supra.
203. 422 U.S. at 515.
204. One of the builders-the Penfield Better Homes Corp.-allegedly was and had "'been
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serted injury to itself. Justice Powell's opinion recognized, however, that
an association may have standing solely as the representative of its
members provided that at least one of those members suffers an injury
sufficient to satisfy article 111.205 The Court held that none of the members
in these organizations had suffered an injury sufficient to satisfy article
III.
Warth also held that Home Builders' claim for money damages was
inappropriate. Because the association itself was not injured and because
the damage claims were not common to the entire membership nor shared
by all in equal degree, these claims were considered peculiar to the
individual members concerned. Justice Powell therefore concluded that
each member with a damage claim would have to represent himself as a
party and Home Builders would have no standing to claim damages on its
members' behalf. On the other hand, since the association's claim for
prospective injunctive relief was seen as benefitting those of its members
who were actually injured by Penfield's ordinance, Warth acknowledged
that this was an appropriate claim for a representative to make.
This determination that an association's standing "depends in
substantial measure on the nature of the relief sought 20 6 may be disputed,
although it probably has little importance beyond blocking the particular
claim made by Home Builders in Warth. The idea seems to be based on
notions of representative suits derived primarily from the class action field,
in which the named plaintiff's authority to seek injunctive relief on behalf
of his class is substantially broader than his ability to secure money
damages for the individual members of the class.20 7 It is certainly not
obvious that these rules are to be employed in the law of standing as it
applies to organizational plaintiffs. In addition, the notion that a party
may have standing to seek certain types of relief but not others, though well
established in statutory cases like Sullivan,20 8 has generally been treated as
a prudential consideration rather than an article III matter. 20 9 Elevating
this limitation to constitutional status would mean that it could not be
overcome even if Congress intended Title VIII or section 1982 to authorize
fair housing suits by associations for their members' damages. 2'0 In any
event, the significance of this rule will probably be limited to the Warth
litigation itself, since home builders who want to assert a damage claim in
future exclusionary zoning cases now know that they, and not their
association, are the proper plaintiffs.
actively attempting to develop moderate income housing' in Penfield, 'but [had] been stymied by its
inability to secure the necessary approvals.'" Id. at 497.
205. Id. at 511.
206. Id. at 515.
207. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (b) (2), (b) (3).
208. See text accompanying notes 7, 9-11, 32-34, 52-55 supra.
209. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499-501 (1975) and cases cited therein.
210. See id. at 501. But see text accompanying notes 236-54 infra.
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Warth is significant, however, because in it the Court recognized that
a home builder does have a potential claim for damages in an exclusionary
zoning case. If the only relief available were a prospective injunction, the
incentives for bringing these suits would be severely limited. This is
particularly true because these suits now seem to be restricted to contests
over an individual housing project.211 As Justice Brennan's dissent in
Warth noted, "the cost of litigating . . . the legality of a refusal to
approve [any particular project] may well be prohibitive., 212 On the other
hand, if a frustrated builder may claim money damages when a town
blocks his development on racial grounds, then exclusionary zoning
decisions may well be challenged on a regular basis. One of the largest fair
housing settlements yet achieved has come in just such a case.21 3
Indeed, the availability of large damage awards has been suggested at
times as a reason for limiting standing to those who are the direct objects of
the defendant's unlawful behavior.21 4 But the clear implication of Justice
Powell's opinion in Warth is that an individual home builder would have a
cause of action for damages if a municipality prevented construction of his
project because of its objections to the race of his prospective tenants. In
such a case, Justice Powell wrote, "both the fact and the extent of injury
would require individualized proof. '21 5 Thus, Warth indicates that
whatever restrictions may be necessary or appropriate to curtail these
claims should be based on the quality of proof and the merits of each
individual case and not on a general refusal to accept home builders as
proper plaintiffs.216
With respect to prospective equitable relief, the home builders in
Warth were denied standing because none of them could allege that any
specific project was currently being blocked by the defendants. The town's
rejection three years earlier of Penfield Better Homes' application to build
a moderate income housing development failed to satisfy this requirement
because, the Court held, it was not alleged that this project remained viable
at the time the complaint was filed. Justice Powell's opinion suggested that
standing would have been found if the complaint had come "within a
reasonable time" after a project was rejected by the proper zoning
217authorities, and in fact MHDC was permitted to sue in Arlington
Heights on the basis of a complaint brought nine months after its rezoning
petition was formally denied. In Warth, however, the Court held that the
211. See text accompanying notes 168-72 supra.
212. 422 U.S. at 530 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
213. See Park View Heights Corp. v. City of Black Jack, 605 F.2d 1033 (8th Cir. 1979) (builders'
damage claim in exclusionary zoning case settled for $450,000).
214. See text accompanying notes 113-21 supra. See also note 186 and accompanying textsupra.
215. 422 U.S. at 515-16.
216. See also text accompanying notes 119-21 supra. Cf. Berger & Bernstein, supra note 114, at
850-55 (assessing plaintiff's claim on the merits as a means to eliminate duplicative, ruinous, windfall,
or speculative recoveries in antitrust cases).
217. 422 U.S. at 517 & n.23.
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complaint failed to show the existence of any injury "of sufficient
immediacy and ripeness to warrant judicial intervention.2 18
The requirement of a recent rejection would seem 'easy enough to
meet. Better Homes could simply resubmit its three-year-old proposal to
be turned down once again by Penfield. Of course, resubmission would
take a certain amount of time and money. As a practical matter, a home
builder might not be willing to go through this procedure just to ensure
that his claim for injunctive relief could be added to his damage claim. If he
did take this step, however, the Court would presumably be satisfied that a
live controversy existed, with the builder still interested in constructing his
project and the town still bent on blocking it. Actually, Better Homes'
willingness and Penfield's intransigence were alleged in Warth, but the
Court held that these allegations alone were inadequate in the absence of
219
an actual up-to-date rejection.
A recent rejection was present in Arlington Heights. Despite some
question about whether MHDC could still qualify for the federal subsidies
needed to build its project, MHDC was held to meet the article III standing
requirements because the plans for its project were detailed and specific
and because the defendants' zoning decision stood as an absolute barrier to
its construction.220 Even though MHDC was a nonprofit corporation, the
Court in Arlington Heights recognized that the thousands of dollars it had
spent on the plans and studies for its proposed development was sufficient
economic injury to satisfy article III. Even more important, according to
the Court, was MHDC's noneconomic interest in making suitable low cost
housing available in areas of need like Arlington Heights. This interest
coupled with the defendants' rejection of MHDC's specific project was also
held sufficient to meet the constitutional requirements of standing.
Having held that MHDC satisfied the article III test, the Arlington
Heights opinion then addressed prudential considerations. Justice Powell
noted that the heart of the plaintiffs' claim was that the defendants' action
had been based not on legitimate zoning concerns but on unconstitutional
racial discrimination directed against MHDC's prospective minority
tenants. Since MHDC, as a corporation, had no racial identity itself,
the opinion asserted that it could not be the "direct target" of this
discrimination. The issue then became whether MHDC, like the
homeowners in Barrows v. Jackson and Sullivan, should be allowed to
overcome the prudential rule against raising third party interests in order
218. Id. at 516. Much of this part of the Warth opinion seems more concerned with mootness
and statute of limitations concerns than with the article III standing requirement of sufficient injury.
See id. at 499 n.10. If Better Homes had sought damages for the past rejection of one of its projects,
which it would have had standing to do according to Warth, see text accompanying notes 217-19 supra,
the damages claimed would be the same whether this suit was brought promptly or not. Any challenge
to such a claim based on its being filed too late would presumably raise a statute of limitations point,
not a standing issue. See, e.g., Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558
F.2d 1283, 1287 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978).
219. See also text accompanying notes 153-64 supra.
220. 429 U.S. at 261-63 & n.7.
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to assert the rights of the minority homeseekers who wanted to live in its
development. 21
This is a puzzling and troublesome part of the Arlington Heights
opinion, for it seems to confuse two fundamentally different concepts.
Those who are the "direct targets" of racial discrimination in housing are,
of course, generally the individual minority homeseekers. But this group is
not the same as the class of persons who are sufficiently injured by the
discrimination to have standing to sue. Those who are injured by housing
discrimination make up a larger group than those minorities who are its
direct targets. This much should have been clear from Trafficante, in which
the plaintiffs' interest in living in an integrated community was viewed as a
right personal to them. This interest was held sufficient to give them
standing, even though the discrimination they complained of was directed
at others. Thus, in Arlington Heights, the fact that MHDC was not the
direct target of the defendants' discrimination simply did not support
Justice Powell's determination to treat MHDC as if it were asserting the
rights of third persons instead of its own rights.
Perhaps an even more basic criticism of this part of Justice Powell's
opinion is that it used the word "direct" at all. "Direct target" may be a
useful phrase to describe those minorities against whom the defendant has
discriminated, although what "direct" adds to this description is not clear.
The standing question, on the other hand, is concerned with deciding who
has been sufficiently injured by this discrimination to be permitted so sue.
When this question is resolved in favor of a plaintiff, he is sometimes said
to have suffered a "direct injury.'222 But this is simply a way for the court to
state its conclusion, not a basis for analysis. There may be nothing wrong
with adopting the phrase "direct injury" simply as a shorthand description
for those injuries that are held sufficient to confer standing, but it must not
be seen as an analytical tool to be used in actually deciding standing cases.
Indeed, in antitrust and other fields in which "direct injury" has been
employed as a rule to define standing, it has proved to be a major source of
confusion.223 The introduction of this test in a new field like housing
discrimination would cause even more problems, because the line between
direct and indirect injuries would inevitably be drawn at different places by
a judiciary with little or no experience in hearing the various types of
claims that can be presented in fair housing cases. Thus, Justice Powell's
221. Id. at 263-64.
222. See note 114 and accompanying text supra.
223.
The ...most important cause ofthe analytical impoverishment ofantitrust standinglaw is
the direct injury rule itself. The rule is inherently unworkable. The distinction between direct
and indirect injury is arbitrary, even metaphysical, since all antitrust injuries are "direct" to a
greater or lesserdegree. The line between direct and indirect injuries must inevitably be drawn
in different places by different courts, often depending on little more than the court's sense of
whether the plaintiff deserves antitrust protection. Standing determinations thus function as
policy judgments but masquerade as inquiries into legal causation.
Berger & Bernstein, supra note 114, at 842-43. See also Scott, supra note 16, at 679-80.
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concern with the "direct targets" of the defendants' discrimination in
Arlington Heights not only confused this concept with the question of who
has standing to sue, but it also introduced a phrasing of the standing
problem that tends to substitute conclusory labels for helpful analysis.
Fortunately, the problems created by Justice Powell's view that
MHDC was asserting the rights of third persons in Arlington Heights turn
out to be rather minor. In the Arlington Heights litigation, because one of
the minority homeseekers was held to have standing, the Court was able to
reach the merits of the case without deciding whether the prudential
limitations of standing prevented MHDC from suing also. As far as future
cases are concerned, builders can avoid the prudential problems suggested
by Arlington Heights in either of two ways. First, as a practical matter,
builders should always be able to find an appropriate minority homeseeker
to join as a co-plaintiff, as MHDC did in Arlington Heights. Second, to
deal with the prudential problem more squarely, builders should bring
their claim under the Fair Housing Act instead of the fourteenth
amendment. As the Warth opinion pointed out, Congress may do away
with the prudential requirement of standing in particular areas. Statutory
causes of action, therefore,-may be brought by persons "who otherwise
would be barred by prudential standing rules. ' 224 The article III
requirements must still be met, of course, but Arlington Heights
specifically held that MHDC's claim did satisfy this test. Thus, a home
builder with a claim similar to MHDC's would have standing under Title
VIII even if he is considered to be "seek[ing] relief on the basis of the legal
rights and interests of others., 22' Exclusionary zoning cases are now more
likely to be brought under Title VIII than the equal protection clause
anyway, because proof of the defendant's discriminatory purpose is
required to make out an equal protection violation, but it may not be
necessary under Title VIII.226 In addition, since claims under the Fair
Housing Act are subject to a short 180-day statute of limitation,227 they
should always meet Warth's requirement of being brought "within a
reasonable time" after the builder's project is rejected.
Nevertheless, Justice Powell's treatment of MHDC's standing is
troublesome. It may not create many practical problems as long as Title
VIII is interpreted broadly, but its view that any plaintiff who is not the
direct target of housing discrimination is not asserting his own rights is an
extremely narrow one that suggests a limited appreciation of the nature of
228fair housing injuries.
224. 422 U.S. at 501.
225. Id.
226. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977);
Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978). See generally Schwemm, supra note 73, at 250-54.
227. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3610(b), 3612(a) (1976).
228. Indeed, this view is directly contradicted by the Fair Housing Act, itself, which specifically
provides a cause of action for any person who is "interfere[d] with . . . on account ofhis having aided
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4. Local Residents: Statutory versus
Constitutional Causes of Action
a. Warth and Title VIII
In Warth v. Seldin, but not in Arlington Heights, the Supreme Court
considered a claim by local residents that their town's exclusionary zoning
practices deprived them of the Trafficante right to live in a racially
integrated community. Metro-Act of Rochester, Inc., one of the
associational plaintiffs in Warth, alleged that nine percent of its
membership was composed of present residents of Penfield and that they
were being deprived of the benefits of living in an integrated town as a
result of the defendants' exclusion of low and moderate income persons.
The Court denied standing, holding that Metro-Act's failure to assert a
Title VIII claim amounted to "the critical distinction between Trafficante
and the situation here. 229 Standing under the Fair Housing Act was seen
as broader than standing to bring the claims asserted in Warth.
As a preliminary matter, it is interesting to note two grounds that the
Court did not choose to rely on in rejecting the Penfield residents' claims.
First, Trafficante could have been distinguished by the fact that it
pertained to only a single apartment complex, not an entire town. The size
of the Trafficante complex (8,200 residents) made it as large as some
villages, but its population was more concentrated and certainly would be
subject to more racial control by its landlord than the population of a town
would be by its zoning officials. Moreover, the local residents in Warth
presumably had the opportunity to influence their zoning officials through
the normal democratic process in a way that would not have been available
to the Trafficante plaintiffs to change their landlord's policies.230 The fact
that nothing was made of this difference in Warth left open the question
whether the Trafficante claim could be made by residents of an entire
community, a question that the Supreme Court was to encounter again
two years later in Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood.21
A second road not taken by the Court in denying standing to the
Penfield residents was to rely on the causation requirement that had been
used to block the minority homeseekers' claim. This claim had been
rejected because the allegations of the minority plaintiffs did not establish a
substantial probability that they would live in Penfield even if the
restrictive zoning ordinance were enjoined. If causation was a problem for
the minority homeseekers, it must certainly have been one for the local
residents, because their claim depended on an additional link in the causal
or encouraged any other person in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected" by Title
VIII. 42 U.S.C. § 3617 (1976). By its terms, this section creates rights in those who are not the direct
target of housing discrimination. See, e.g., Smith v. Stechel, 510 F.2d 1162(9th Cir. 1975); Laufmari v.
Oakley Bldg. & Loan Co., 408 F. Supp. 489 (S.D. Ohio 1976).
229. 422 U.S. at 513. See note 131 supra.
230. See 422 U.S. at 508 n.18.
231. 441 U.S. 91 (1979).
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chain beyond that alleged by the minority plaintiffs' The minority plaintiffs
claimed that without the exclusionary zoning ordinance, housing would be
built for them, and they would move to Penfield.23 a The local residents
claimed all of this and one more fact: that when the minorities did move to
Penfield, the local residents would then enjoy the benefits of living in an
integrated community. This last link in the chain is certainly not self-
evident, because the new minority residents would be housed in a
subsidized project that might be set apart physically and socially from the
rest of the town.233 In any event, since the minority homeseekers' claim was
considered inadequate from a causation standpoint, the local residents'
claim was subject to at least as much criticism on this ground.234
Instead of discussing the causation problems presented by the
Penfield residents' claim or trying to draw a factual distinction between
this claim and the one asserted in Trafficante, Justice Powell chose to rely
exclusively on the absence of Title VIII as the reason for denying standing
to the local residents in Warth. He distinguished Trafficante on the ground
that "Congress may create a statutory right or entitlement the alleged
deprivation of which can confer standing to sue even where the plaintiff
would have suffered no judicially cognizable injury in the absence of
statute. . . .No such statute is applicable here."2 "
There are a number of problems with this approach that the Warth
opinion did not consider. First, assume that Congress may not abrogate
the article III requirements of standing-an assumption made explicit by
Justice Powell in Warth.236 How is it possible for a statute likeTitle VIII to
give standing to a particular claimant, when his claim fails to satisfy the
article III requirements on its own apart from the statute? The Warth
opinion seems to say that the Fair Housing Act not only defines standing as
broadly as article III permits, as Trafficante had held, but also that the Act
can somehow expand article III by conferring standing when no "judicially
cognizable injury" would otherwise be recognized. Here, Justice Powell
cited Justice White's concurring opinion in Trafficante,237 which he had
joined, and which indicated skepticism about the plaintiffs' ability to meet
the article III requirements absent the Fair Housing Act. With the suit
authorized 'by Title VIII, however, Justice White agreed that the
Trafficante plaintiffs' claim presented a case or controversy under article
III. He cited as authority for this proposition Katzenbach v. Morgan238
232. See note 164 supra.
233. See Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 113 (1979).
234. This may explain why the principal dissent in Warth, which advocated standing for the
minority homeseekers, did not make a similar plea for the local resident plaintiffs, see 422 U.S. at519-
30 (Brennan, J., dissenting), although Justice Brennan did not give this or any other reason for his
determination to treat these two classes of plaintiffs differently.
235. 422 U.S. at 514 (citations omitted).
236. Id. at 501. See also Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979).
237. 422 U.S. at 514, citing 409 U.S. at 212 (White, J., concurring).
238. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
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and Oregon v. Mitchell,3 9 two cases in which the Court had interpreted the
enforcement clause of the fourteenth amendment to empower Congress to
outlaw practices that the Court itself would not hold unconstitutional. The
implication of the Trafficante concurrence and of Justice Powell's reliance
on it in Warth is that this power authorizes Congress to confer standing on
a fair housing plaintiff whose claim would not satisfy article III in the
absence of the statute.
It should be noted that this theory necessitates a significant extension
of the enforcement clause cases. In Katzenbach v. Morgan, for example,
the Court upheld a congressional ban on literacy tests despite an earlier
judicial determination that these tests did not violate the equal protection
clause. In Katzenbach the Court concluded that the enforcement clause
power authorized Congress to decide "whether and what legislation is
needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment., 240 It is
quite another matter, however, to hold that this fourteenth amendment
power allows Congress to resolve questions of standing under article III.
The case or controversy requirement of article III, unlike the substantive
provisions of the fourteenth amendment, has generally been considered a
matter over which the Court alone has final authority.24 t
In the context of a case like Warth, however, two reasons suggest
themselves for judicial deference to Congress in the matter of defining
whether a particular claim is sufficient to satisfy article III. The first is
Warth's concern for the "properly limited role of courts in a democratic
society,'2 42 and the Supreme Court's determination to maintain standing
as a method of allocating authority between the various branches of
government and as a barrier to "government by injunction., 243 In response
to this concern, it might well be argued that the danger of excessive judicial
intrusion into matters entrusted to the political branches of government is
reduced when Congress passes and the President signs the very law
authorizing the intrusion.244
239. 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
240. 384 U.S. at 651.
241. E.g., Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911). See generally Tushnet, supra note 112,
at 677-78.
242. 422 U.S. at 498.
243. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 222 (1974).
244. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 132 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Scott, supra note 16, at
686-87; Tushnet, supra note 112, at 667-68. This argument responds to the Schlesinger notion that the
injury requirement of article III is intended in part to guarantee properjudicial respect for the decisions
of the legislative and executive branches of the federal government, thereby helping to avoid
unnecessary confrontations between them. See 418 U.S. at 221-22,224 n. 14. A separate reason given in
Warth for limiting the power of article III courts is that certain matters, like zoning ordinances, "are
peculiarly within the province ofstate and local legislative authorities" and are thus more appropriately
dealt with by the states rather than the federal courts. See422 U.S. at 508 n.18. This federalism concern
is, of course, not answered by the fact that a federal fair housing law has been enacted, although it is
worth remembering that the fourteenth amendment did shift substantial power from the states to the
federal government in the matter of civil rights. The power that it created in Congress includes the
authority to prohibit discriminatory state actions regardless of how localized those actions might seem.
See notes 245-54 and accompanying text infra; Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
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The second reason is derived from the basic rationale of Katzenbach
v. Morgan, which indicated that Congress may be in a better position than
the Court to make factual determinations about civil rights violations.245
Under this theory, the Court, while maintaining its own article III
requirement of a causal link between the defendant's behavior and the
plaintiff's injuries, might defer to a congressional determination that
causation did in fact exist in a given type of case. The problem in Warth
was that, even with the detailed allegations supplied by the plaintiffs, the
Court still felt unsure about whether a decree enjoining the Penfield zoning
ordinance would result in an integrated community, and it was unwilling
to proceed on the basis of its own speculation on this point. On the other
hand, if Congress had already determined in Title VIII that a local resident
is injured when his community's racial make-up is maintained as all-white,
as was the case in Trafficante, then the Court may have accepted this
decision on causation rather than itself speculate about the matter.246
Indeed, the causal link between exclusionary zoning ordinances and the
lack of integration in suburban communities was specifically referred to in
the legislative history of the Fair Housing Act. Senator Mondale, the
principal sponsor of Title VIII, noted: "In part, this inability [of Blacks to
move to all white areas] stems from a refusal by suburbs and other
communities to accept low-income housing. . . . An important factor
contributing to exclusion of Negroes from such areas, moreover, has been
the policies and practices of government at all levels. 247 In addition, the
congressional determination to rely primarily on private suits to enforce
the Fair Housing Act 248 necessarily includes the judgment that the article
III courts, over which Congress has some jurisdictional authority,249 are
well-equipped from a functional as well as a resource standpoint to deal
with these claims. 250 Against this background, the Katzenbach v. Morgan
rationale of judicial deference to congressional factfinding in civil rights
matters does justify the Warth conclusion that Title VIII may confer
standing on a plaintiff whose claim might not otherwise satisfy article III.
What, then, is left of the notion that Congress cannot abrogate the
article III requirements of standing? The answer in fair housing cases
245. Id. at 653-56.
246. See generally City of Hartford v. Town of Glastonbury, 561 F.2d 1048, 1052-53 (2nd Cir.
1976) (rehearing en bane 1977) (Kaufman, C.J., concurring), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1978).
247. 114 CONG. REC. 2277 (1968) (quoting from COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS REPORT 60
(1967)).
248. See text accompanying notes 95-102 supra.
249. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. See, e.g., Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182 (1943).
250. Congress was aware of the crowded calendars facing federal courts at the time it enacted
Title VIII. See 114 CONG. REc. 4987 (1968) (remarks of Sen. Miller); id. (remarks of Sen. Hart);
Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 127 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Thus, its
determination not to restrict Title VIII standing in any way, see id., reflects a judgment that the
caseload burdens of the federal courts should not be a significant factor in determining Title VII1
standing. See generally Scott, supra note 16, at 676, 682. Cf. Berger& Bernstein, supra note 114, at857
(antitrust litigation provided for with congressional awareness of the burdens on the courts).
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would seem to be: "Not much." The theory of Justice White's concurrence
in Trafficante, adopted by the Court in Warth, potentially reduces all
standing questions in housing discrimination cases to matters of statutory
interpretation.25 t Unless some exemption or statute of limitation problem
makes Title VIII unavailable, local resident plaintiffs like the ones in
Warth would now be expected to bring their claims under the Fair
Housing Act.252 The standing question would then be simply whether
Congress intended to permit this particular type of claimant to sue. If the
answer is "Yes," then the additional article III issue is all but resolved in the
plaintiff's favor because, under the generous Katzenbach v. Morgan test,
the congressional determination is accepted as constitutional unless the
Court can find no rational basis for it.253 It is hard to conceive of such a
case. Once the Court holds that Congress intended for a particular plaintiff
to be able to sue under Title VIII, he will almost certainly be recognized as
having met the article III requirements as well. 54
b. Warth and Section 1982
A second major problem with the Court's attempt in Warth to
distinguish Trafficante as a statutory case is that Warth itself involved
statutory claims. While Title VIII was not pleaded, the plaintiffs did rely on
the 1866 Civil Rights Act as well as on various constitutional provisions.255
Their section 1982 claim was all but ignored by the Court. Nevertheless,
that Justice Powell was able to conclude that no statute like Title VIII "is
applicable here" to confer standing on the Penfield residents256 has very
definite implications for standing under section 1982. The Warth opinion
suggests not only that section 1982 standing is narrower than standing
under Title VIII, but that it is no broader than standing under a
constitutional provision like the equal protection clause.
Why this should be so is not at all clear. Presumably, standing under
both Title VIII and section 1982 ought to be determined in the same way-
by divining the underlying congressional intent and construing the statute
accordingly. While this process could certainly result in different standards
for standing under these two laws, the point is that the Supreme Court has
25 1. See also Tushnet, supra note 112, at 670.
252. See note 226 and accompanying text supra. A nice question after Warth-and one that has
yet to be addressed-is whether a Warth-type complaint by minority homeseekers and local builders
against an exclusionary zoning ordinance will be held to satisfy article III in the absence of a specific
housing project, if the claim is brought under Title VIII. See note 254 infra; see also Planning for
People Coalition v. County of DuPage, 70 F.R.D. 38 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
253. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650-53 (1966).
254. But see City of Hartford v. Town of Glastonbury, 561 F.2d 1048 (2nd Cir. 1977) (en bane),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1978); Evans v. Lynn, 537 F.2d 589 (2nd Cir. 1976) (en banc), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1066 (1977). These decisions denied standing to sue in statutory actions on the ground that
Warthi causation requirement was not satisfied. They show that article III may still be a substantial
barrier, at least in the Second Circuit, to certain types of housing discrimination complaints, even if
they are brought under Title VIII. The decisions are criticized in Sager, supra note 14, at 1395-98.
255. 422 U.S. at 493.
256. i. at 514.
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simply not yet considered the matter of standing under section 1982 in any
depth. The only time the Court specifically focused on section 1982
standing before Warth was in Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc. In that
case it upheld the standing of a white lessor and noted that a "narrow
construction of the language of § 1982 would be quite inconsistent with the
broad and sweeping nature of the protection meant to be afforded" by it.
257
Thus, even though Warth appears to reject the notion of a Trafficante-type
claim under section 1982, the opinion's treatment of the issue is simply too
cavalier to be considered the last word on the matter. 58
Finally, the fact that Justice Powell described the local residents in
Warth as being "harmed indirectly by the exclusion of others"259 once
again indicates his endorsement of the distinction between "direct" and
"indirect" injuries in fair housing cases. 260 The Warth opinion read what
was essentially the same claim as in Trafficante as a desire by the local
residents to be free from the adverse consequences "of racially
discriminatory practices directed at and immediately harmful to
others. 16' As discussed above, 62 the fact that discrimination is directed at
others should not be considered determinative of whether it is "directly" or
"immediately" harmful to the plaintiffs, whatever those descriptions may
mean. What is clear from Warth, unfortunately, is that Justice Powell not
only equated the "direct target" group with the "direct injury" group, but
that he also believed that these concepts had some analytical value, and
that, in particular, plaintiffs who are not the direct targets of discrimina-
tion should be viewed as asserting the rights of others. This view is
apparently not significant in Title VIII cases, 263 but, as Warth shows, it can
257. 396 U.S. at 237. See also Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431(1973),
in which the Supreme Court, without discussing standing, unanimously upheld the § 1982 claim of a
white couple whose black guest had been refused access to the couple's neighborhood recreation
association.
258. Compare Broadmore Improvement Ass'n v. Stan Weber & Assocs., 597 F.2d 568 (5th Cir.
1979), with Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 128-29 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). The Warih opinion did refer to Sullivan once in connection with the local residents' claim,
and this reference underscored Justice Powell's narrow reading of§ 1982. He argued that, apart from
article III problems, prudential considerations strongly counseled against hearing this claim. The
Penfield residents' injury was categorized as being caused "indirectly by the exclusion of others," which
Justice Powell saw as"an attempt to raise putative rights of third parties." 422 U.S. at 514. Sullivan was
cited as an exception to this prudential rule that was justified because the plaintiff's contractual
relationship with a third party protected by § 1982 was being punished or disrupted by the defendants
therein, whereas no such relationship existed in Warth. This is a narrow reading of Sullivan, because it
assumes that the white homeowner in that case was asserting his tenants' rights and not his own. It also
assumes that the prudential limitations on standing generally apply to § 1982 cases, even though they
apparently do not under Title VIII. See 422 U.S. 514-15. The holding in Sullivan, of course, remains
unchanged: the white homeowner has a right of action under § 1982. See id. at 513. But the expansive
approach to § 1982 standing advocated in Sullivan is certainly undercut by the Warth interpretation.
259. 422 U.S. at 514.
260. See text accompanying notes 221-23 supra.
261. 422 U.S. at 513.
262. See text accompanying notes 78-79, 221-23 supra.
263. See text accompanying notes 224-28, 237-56 supra; and 301-09 infra.
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severely restrict standing in fair housing suits brought under section 1982
or constitutional provisions.
D. Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood
1. Background and Holding
In Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood,264 the Supreme Court
recognized standing in local residents who asserted Title VIII claims
similar to those upheld in Trafficante. Two separate but virtually identical
suits were brought against two realtors and their employees, who were
accused of racial "steering" in violation of Title VIII and section 1982.
Specifically, the complaints alleged that defendants directed black
prospective home buyers interested in the western suburbs of Chicago to a
particular integrated area of Bellwood, Illinois, while sending similarly-
situated white prospects to neighboring towns that were virtually all white.
Three types of plaintiffs joined the suits: (1) six individuals who lived in or
near the target area in Bellwood alleged that their right to select housing
without regard to race had been denied and that they had been" 'deprived
of the social and professional benefits of living in an integrated
society;' ,265 (2) the Village of Bellwood asserted that its housing market
had been illegally manipulated to the economic and social detriment of its
citizens; and (3) the Leadership Council for Metropolitan Open
Communities, a fair housing organization that had helped the other
plaintiffs investigate the defendants' steering practices, claimed that its
interest in ending housing discrimination in the Chicago area was harmed.
Plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief and substantial money
damages.
Defendants initially responded by moving for dismissal on the ground
that the complaints failed to state a claim under Title VIII or section 1982.
This motion was denied.266 Thereafter, discovery established that none of
the plaintiffs was in the market for a new home at the time the steering
allegedly took place, and based on this fact, defendants moved for
summary judgment on standing grounds. They argued that since plaintiffs
were not actual homeseekers who had themselves been steered, they were
not the "direct victims" of defendants' violations and therefore lacked
standing to sue. Defendants sought to distinguish Trafficante on the
ground that its broad reading of Title VIII standing should apply only to
section 3610 suits brought after an initial complaint to HUD, not to direct
actions like this one brought under section 3612.267
264. 441 U.S. 91 (1979).
265. Id. at 95, quoting Village of Bellwood v. Gladstone Realtors, No.77-1493 at 6, app.99 (N.D.
111. Sept. 23, 1976).
266. In denying the defendants' motion to dismiss, the district court stated that "the complaint
on its face does state a claim for relief under [§ 1982 and Title VIII]." Village ofBellwood v. Gladstone
Realtors, No. 77-1493 app. 23 (N.D. I1l. Sept. 23, 1976).
267. See note 57 and accompanying text supra.
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Defendants' argument, which was based on the Ninth Circuit's
decision in TOPIC v. Circle Realty,268 was accepted at the trial court level.
The Seventh Circuit disagreed, 269 holding that standing under section 3612
was as broad as standing under section 3610 and therefore, that Trafficante
should be read to confer Title VIII standing on the six individual
homeowners and the Village of Bellwood. Dismissal of the Leadership
Council was upheld on the ground that its interest in fair housing was
insufficient to meet the article III requirements as defined by the Supreme
Court in Sierra Club v. Morton.270 The Seventh Circuit decided that there
was "no need to consider standing under section 1982 separately. 27 I In so
doing, it followed the Trafficante technique of avoiding the section 1982
issue once standing under Title VIII was found.
The Supreme Court affirmed. 72 Justice Powell's opinion for a seven-
man majority reviewed the various differences between Title VIII suits
brought under section 3610 and those brought under section 3612273 and
concluded that none of these differences supported the view that sections
3610 and 3612 conferred standing on different classes of plaintiffs. As in
Trafficante, the basic issue in Bellwoodwas treated as a matter of statutory
construction, with the Court considering Title VIII's language, structure,
legislative history, and HUD's administrative interpretation. The Court
then concluded that "Congress intended to provide all victims of Title VIII
violations two alternative mechanisms by which to seek redress: immediate
suit in federal district court, or a simple, inexpensive, informal conciliation
procedure, to be followed by litigation should conciliation efforts fail. 274
Quoting from Trafficante, Bellwood held that standing to sue directly
under section 3612, like standing to sue after an administrative complaint
268. 532 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 859 (1976).
269. 569 F.2d 1013 (7th Cir. 1978).
270. 405 U.S. 727 (1972). See 569 F.2d at 1017. This ruling was not challenged in the Supreme
Court. 441 U.S. at 98 n.5.
271. 569 F.2d at 1017 n.4. See text accompanying notes 68-77 supra.
272. The Court questioned the standing of two of the six individual plaintiffs on the ground that
they lived outside the target area of the defendants' steering practices. 441 U.S. at 112-13 n.25. See text
accompanying notes 279-81 infra. With this limitation, the Seventh Circuit's decision was affirmed. 441
U.S. at 99.
273. 441 U.S. at 100-09. See also id. at 116-28 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The principal
difference between § 3610 and § 3612 is that the former requires that an administrative complaint be
filed with HUD prior to the complainant's proceeding to court, while the latter authorizes an
"immediate suit." Id. at 103. Section 3610 complaints may be brought by any "person aggrieved," while
§ 3612 contains no restrictions on who may sue. Id.; see note 57 supra. There are other differences as
well, most of which restrict § 3610 actions. Thus, additional statute of limitations problems exist under
§ 3610 beyond those found in § 3612, see 441 U.S. at 103-04 n.10, and a § 3610 complainant may be
required to pursue state or local remedies the availability of which do not limit § 3612. See id. at 104
n.1 1. In addition, a § 3610 claim may be brought only in federal court, which is limited to providing
injunctive relief in such a case, while a § 3612 suit may be brought instate or federal court, and damages
and attorney's fees may be awarded as well as equitable relief. See id. at 125-26. See also notes 50,76
supra. Finally, Title VIII directs a court hearing a claim under§ 3612 to "assign the case for hearingat
the earliest practicable date and cause the case to be in every way expedited" (42 U.S.C. § 3614 (1976)),
a provision that does not apply to § 3610 cases.
274. 441 U.S. at 104.
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is filed under section 3610, is" 'as broa[d] as is permitted by Article III of
the Constitution.' ,275
The Bellvood opinion then went on to consider the article III issue.
The Court held that the claims of both the village and the local residents in
the target area satisfied the constitutional requirements of standing. Thus,
the Supreme Court once again accepted the judgment of Congress that an
injury sufficient to be protected against by Title VIII is sufficient to meet
the constitutional requirements of standing. This is hardly surprising.
After Warth and Justice White's concurrence in Trafficante, the chances
are slim indeed that the Court would ever hold that a plaintiff's injury is
covered by Title VIII but that it is inadequate to meet article III
276
requirements.
In Bellwood, the municipality's complaint, which was held sufficient
under article III, was that the defendants had manipulated the village's
racial make-up by steering black prospective home purchasers exclusively
to the target neighborhood while directing white purchasers away from it.
The Court recognized that having one of its integrated areas turned into a
segregated one could have profound adverse consequences for the village,
as property values were deflected downward and the municipal tax base
was thereby diminished. In addition to these fiscal concerns, other
problems likely to result from a racially segregated community, such as
school segregation, were noted.277 Justice Powell concluded that a town's
interest in promoting stable, racially integrated housing was sufficient to
satisfy article III. If the defendants' sales practices "actually have begun to
rob Bellwood of its racial balance and stability, the Village has standing to
challenge the legality of that conduct. 278
275. Id. at 109, quoting 409 U.S. at 209.
276. See text accompanying notes 237-54 supra.
277. 441 U.S. at I II n.24 (citing, inter alia, remarks of Senator Mondale made during the
legislative debates on Title VIII, 114 CONG. REc. 2276 (1968) ).
278. 441 U.S. at I l. The Bellwood defendants challenged the village's standing on two other
grounds. First, they argued that Bellwood lacked standing because it was not a "person" as defined in
Title VI I. The court of appeals rejected this argument, noting that the statute's definition of"person"
includes "corporations," see 42 U.S.C. § 3602(d) (1976), which the court read to cover municipal
corporations like Bellwood. 569 F.2d at 1020 n.8. A variation on this argument was made to the
Supreme Court; the defendants claimed that the village could not sue under § 3612 because the caption
of this section refers to suits by "private persons." Since this particular argument had not been passed
on by the court of appeals, the Supreme Court did not consider it. 441 U.S. at 109 n.21. See generally
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 147 n.2 (1970). The Court left little doubt, however, that it
found the defendants' argument unpersuasive. That the Supreme Court did not feel required to decide
this point demonstrates that it is simply a matter of statutory, rather than constitutional standing. Cf.
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 260 (1977) (the Court
addressed the issue of plaintiffs' constitutional standing, although it was unclear whether this issue had
been raised in the court below, because its jurisdiction to decide the case was implicated). As a matter of
statutory construction, the defendants' argument that the "private person" caption of § 3612 should
limit standing is weakened substantially by the fact that nothing in the body of this section contains any
such limitation. See Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 102-04 (1979). See
generally Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 331 U.S. 519,528-29 (1947). The use
of "private person" in § 3612's heading was probably meant simply to distinguish enforcement actions
under this section from public enforcement actions by H UD under § 36 10 and by the Attorney General
under § 3613. Congress knew how to provide for exemptions when it wrote Title VIII. See 42 U.S.C. §§
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With respect to the claims of the six indivi'dual homeowners, the
Court drew a distinction between the four who actually lived within the
target area and the two who lived nearby. The complaint of the four local
plaintiffs-that the defendants' practices were transforming their
neighborhood from an integrated community to a predominantly black
one-was held to satisfy article III. Because the Bellwood complaint was
read to allege injury only to this particular neighborhood and its residents,
however, the two outsiders were denied standing. The Court did, though,
leave open the question whether outsiders with similar claims who did
allege actual harm to themselves might have standing under Title VIII.2"
The Supreme Court viewed the injuries of the four local plaintiffs as
first, the economic threat to the value of their homes created by the
defendants' steering and second, the lost social and professional benefits of
integrated living. This latter injury had been held sufficient for article III
purposes in Trafficante.28° Justice Powell rejected the defendants'
argument that the Trafficante injury should be recognized only for those in
a single residential complex because he perceived "no categorical
distinction between injury from racial steering suffered by occupants of a
large apartment complex and that imposed upon residents of a relatively
compact neighborhood such as Bellwood. 281
2. The Significance of Bellwood: Some
Refinements of Trafficante and Warth
In many respects, Bellwood is simply a logical extension of
Trafficante. Indeed, perhaps Bellwood's principal significance is that it
reaffirmed the Supreme Court's commitment in Trafficante to a broad
3603, 3607 (1976). If Congress had intended to carve out an exception to the broad standing authorized
by § 3612 for municipal corporations, no doubt it would have done so explicitly. In other cases, local
governments have been permitted to assert their interest in integrated housing. See, e.g., Linmark
Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977); Barrick Realty Inc. v. City of Gary, 491 F.2d
161 (7th Cir. 1974); City of Hartford v. Hills, 408 F. Supp. 889 (D. Conn. 1976), rev'don other grounds
sub nom. City of Hartford v. Town of Glastonbury, 561 F.2d 1048 (2nd Cir. 1977) (en banc), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1978); Marin City Council v. Marin County Redev. Agency, 416 F. Supp. 700
(N.D. Cal. 1975). See also Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 469 F.
Supp. 836 (N.D. II. 1979) (intervention by neighboring town objecting to integrated housing project
permitted).
279. Id. at 112-13 & n.25. Although unsuccessful on the merits, homeowners have been
permitted to challenge the funding of a subsidized housing project in an adjacent neighborhood. See
South East Chicago Comm'nv. HUD, 488 F.2d 119 (7th Cir. 1973); see also Metropolitan Hous. Dev.
Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 469 F. Supp. 836 (N.D. Il1. 1979) (residents of neighboring town
permitted to intervene to object to the construction of a subsidized housing project).
280. 441 U.S. at 113 n.26. As the Court noted, the complaint of the Bellwood residents differed
from the claim made in Trafficante in one respect. In Trafficante the defendants were accused of
preventing an all-white community from becoming integrated, while in Bellwood the complaint was
that a currently integrated area was being turned predominantly black. The precise Trafficante-type
claim in Bellwood would actually lie with the residents of the white towns adjacent to Bellwood to
which the defendants steered only white homeseekers. In any event, the Supreme Court found the
difference in the Beliwood and Trafficante complaints unimportant for standing purposes, because
"[i]n both situations, the deprivation of the benefits of interracial associations constitutes the alleged
injury." Id.
281. Id. at 114.
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reading of standing under the Fair Housing Act. By ignoring the section
1982 claim, the Bellwood opinion also followed Trafficante, implying
again that standing under section 1982 need not be considered if the
plaintiffs' Title VIII claims are permitted to go forward.
282
Bellwood did make certain refinements in Trafficante's recognition of
standing under Title VIII for local residents who claim that the defendants
are racially manipulating the community in which they live. First, the
Bellwood opinion emphasized the importance of the compact nature of the
target neighborhood. Not only did the Court reject the two outsiders as
potential plaintiffs, it regularly referred to the 12 x 13 block dimensions of
the specific target area and to the fact that this area had been "carefully
described" in the complaint.283 Justice Powell cautioned:
A "neighborhood" whose racial composition allegedly is being manipulated
may be so extensive in area, so heavily or even so sparsely populated, or so
lacking in shared social and commercial intercourse that there would be no
actual injury to a particular resident. The presence of a genuine injury should
be ascertainable on the basis of discrete facts presented at trial. 8
Thus, in order to assert a Bellwood-type claim, local residents
apparently have to show that their neighborhood or community is the type
of place in which they would actually reap the benefits of interracial
association if integration existed there. In addition, this functional
definition of "neighborhood" in Bellwood also serves to limit the class of
plaintiffs who can assert the Title VIII right to live in an integrated
community in a given case. The opinion makes clear that not everyone in
the country may complain that Bellwood realtors are engaged in racial
steering. The number of potential plaintiffs is defined by the boundaries of
the target neighborhood that is being racially manipulated,285 and
although this number may run into the thousands, as it did in Trafficante, it
certainly is not unlimited.286
It is interesting that Justice Powell should end his description of the
kind of neighborhood needed for standing in a Bellwood-type claim with
the admonition that resolution of this issue should await the presentation
of evidence at trial. This is the position advocated by the dissenters in
Warth,287 in which Justice Powell insisted on deciding the "threshold
question" of standing on the basis of a pretrial motion to dismiss. By way
of contrast, the Bellwood opinion leaves much of the standing issue to be
decided after the evidence has been presented.288
282. See text accompanying notes 68-77 supra.
283. 441 U.S. at 95, 112-14.
284. Id. at 114.
285. Id. at 112-13 & n.25.
286. The Supreme Court noted that the population of Bellwood, of which the target
neighborhood was only a part, had been estimated at 20,969 in 1975. Id. at 113 n.27.
287. 422 U.S. at 519 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Id. at 526-27 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
288. For example, Justice Powell indicated that it would be necessary for the Bellwoodplaintiffs
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In a footnote to the Bellwood opinion, Justice Powell acknowledged
that this approach was a departure from the usual method of deciding
standing issues "at the earliest stages of litigation., 2 9 He announced that
"sometimes" a trial judge should defer the standing decision until after the
evidence is presented at trial.290 His opinion, however, provided no
guidance whatsoever about when and under what circumstances this might
be appropriate. Perhaps the Court is finally beginning to realize how
inadequate the pleadings are as a technique for illuminating the factual
matters that the Court believes are necessary to resolve the standing issue.
Just like the plaintiffs in Warth, the plaintiffs in Bellwood alleged that thedefendants' illegal practices caused them injury. They did so with a good
deal more particularity than the federal rules require. Yet JusticePowell
still felt compelled to criticize the complaints as "more conclusory and
abbreviated than good pleading would suggest. 292 In contrast to Warth,
however, he did not find them so inadequate as to fail to satisfy article III.
The lesson for fair housing plaintiffs is clear: their complaints, at least in
cases that allege something more than a simple refusal to deal, may be
judged by a much more rigorous standard of pleading than is usually
required under the federal rules. After Bellwood, however, allegations of
unlawful conduct, causation, and injury under Title VIII generally should
not be dismissed on standing grounds until they have been the subject of
proof at trial.293
to establish the causal connection between their loss of interracial associations and the defendants'
steering practices. The proper time for this showing was thought to be'at trial, not in the midst of
discovery in response to a summary judgment motion. 441 U.S. at 114 & n.29. The defendants might
well have argued that, as individual realtors, the number of home sales they made was simply too small
to affect the racial make-up of a town the size of Bellwood, even if they did steer the prospects who came
to them. See Fair Hous. Council of Bergen County, Inc. v. Eastern Bergen County Multiple Listing
Serv., Inc., 422 F. Supp. 1071 (D.N.J. 1976) (defendants represent the entire real estate market of the
target area). But instead of making a judgment on this causation point before trial, as it had in Warth,
the Supreme Court accepted the Bellwood plaintiffs' claim of causation and left the decision on this
point to be made after presentation of the evidence at trial. 441 U.S. 114 n.29. Similarly, the economic
injury to the local residents' investment in their homes was considered "a fact subject to proof before
the District Court." Id. at 115. Just as the village would have standing if it proved that the defendants'
practices actually upset Bellwood's racial balance and stability, see id. at 112, so too would the local
residents be held to satisfy article III if "convincing evidence" were produced that the value of their
homes declined as a result of the defendants' conduct. Id. at 115.
289. Id at 115 n.31.
290. Id.
291. See id. at 94-95, 109-15. See also text accompanying notes 149-67 supra.
292. 441 U.S. at 110.
293. A possible explanation for the difference between Bellwood and Warth concerning the
proper timing of the article III standing decision may be derived from the fact that a statute was the
basis for the substantive claim in Bellwood, while Warth was viewed as a constitutional claim. But see
text accompanying notes 255-63 supra. Indeed, in the Warth opinion the Court contended that the
distinguishing feature between the local residents' claim in Warth and the one asserted in Trafficante
was the absence of a Title VIII claim in Warth. The causation requirement ofarticle III must be met no
matter what the substantive basis of the claim. The Court may be less skeptical, however, of an alleged
chain of causation linking a defendant's housing discrimination to the local residents' interest in
integration because Congress, in passing Title VIII, believed in such a causal link. See Traflicante v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 210-11 & n.10 (1972); Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809, 816
(3rd Cir. 1970); and text accompanying notes 245-50 supra. See also City of Hartford v. Town of
Glastonbury, 561 F.2d 1048, 1052-53 (2nd Cir. 1977) (en banc) (Kaufman, C.J., concurring), cert.
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If unlawful conduct, causation, and injury are established at trial, the
plaintiff'would not only have standing, he would presumably prevail on the
merits as well.294 In Bellwood, as in many other standing cases, the
Supreme Court failed to make clear what, if any, distinction exists between
a fair housing plaintiff's standing and his right to recover as a matter of
substantive law.295 The Bellwood opinion indicated that in order to
establish their standing, plaintiffs would have to prove the following: (1)
that the defendants' steering practices robbed Bellwood of its racial
balance and stability; (2) that the area in which these practices occurred
was the type of neighborhood in which valuable interracial associations
would otherwise take place; (3) that the nature and extent of the
defendants' business was substantial enough to cause, and in fact did
cause, the racial manipulation complained of; (4) and that the economic
value of the local residents' homes declined as a result of the defendants'
conduct. 296 If all of this were established at trial, the plaintiffs would surely
be entitled to a judgment on the merits, not merely recognition of their
standing. On the other hand, if any of the necessary elements of racial
discrimination, injury, or causation were not proved, then the defendants
presumably would prevail.297 Moreover, they should prevail not merely on
article III standing grounds, which would permit the suit to be reinstituted
in state court, 298 but once and for all on the merits.
There simply is no good reason for the Bellwood opinion to have held
out the possibility that the plaintiffs might be denied standing after a trial.
As a matter of law, Trafficante had already held that a local resident's
allegation of lost interracial associations as a result of the racial
manipulation of his community is sufficient to meet the standing
requirements of both Title VIII and article III. As a matter of policy, the
only apparent justification for ever limiting Title VIII standing (as opposed
to limiting its substantive reach) is to conserve judicial resources. 299 This
denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1978). The Court may therefore be more willing to defer a judgment on the
causation issue in a Title VIII case until all of the evidence has been presented at trial than it would be if
only a constitutional claim were at issue.
294. See text accompanying notes 107-12 supra.
295. See text accompanying notes 27-31, 50-55, 105-12 supra.
296. 441 U.S. at 109-15. Actually, proof of either (2) or (4) alone would suffice, since either of
these facts would establish one of the types of injuries to the individual plaintiffs that the Court in
Beliood held would satisfy article Ill. See id. at 112, 114.
297. This does not mean, of course, that realtors who engage in racial steering may be confident
of escaping liability just because local residents might not be able to prove that the area involved is a
"neighborhood" as described in Bellwood or that the defendant's operations are too small to have
caused a racial shift in the relevant community. These elements are only required in a local resident's
claim based on the loss of interracial associations. Failure to prove them would not defeat other
appropriate claims, such as those brought by the individual homeseekers who were actually steered by
the realtors, or enforcement actions by the Attorney General under § 3613. See also Brown v. State
Realty Co., 304 F. Supp. 1236, 1241 (N.D. Ga. 1969) (successful private suit challenging defendants'
"attempt" to blockbust under § 3604(e) ).
298. See notes 48-49 and accompanying text supra.
299. See text accompanying notes 113-21, 185-87 supra. See also note 250 supra. An additional
reason for limiting standing under Title VIII was put forth by the Bellwood defendants. They argued
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justification would be lost if the standing decisionwere regularly deferred
until after trial. And as a matter of practicalities, few judges are likely to
decide that the plaintiff lacks standing after hearing the entire case on the
merits.300 If the plaintiff's proof fails at this stage on the issue of causation
or some other necessary element, then a decision on the merits would
better serve the interests of the courts and the parties than would a
rejection of the plaintiff's standing. For all practical purposes, therefore,
the result of Justice Powell's approach in Bellwood is to recognize standing
in the four local residents and the Village. Once a Bellwood-type claim
successfully passes the pleading stage, the plaintiff should be permitted to
go to trial on the merits.
The language and structure of the Fair Housing Act indicate a
congressional intention to have Title VIII suits decided on the merits
rather than on standing grounds. Who may sue under the two sections
authorizing private suits is specifically defined in terms of the substantive
provisions of the Act found in sections 3604, 3605, and 3606.301 Indeed, as
the Bellwood opinion pointed out, section 3612 on its face contains no
restrictions on who has standing under Title VIII.
30 2
Justice Powell's response to this statutory scheme in Bellwood once
again relied on the distinction between "direct" and "indirect" victims of
housing discrimination.30 3 Direct victims were those homeseekers whom
the defendants had actually steered and, according to the Bellwood
opinion, it was their substantive rights under section 3604 that were being
enforced.30 4 Nevertheless, the Bellwood plaintiffs were permitted to assert
these "rights of others" because the Supreme Court decided that Congress
did away with the normal prudential limitations on standing in Title
VIII.30 5 Thus, once again Justice Powell's questionable determination to
that the legislative history reflected a congressional concern that the Fair Housing Act "not be used as
an instrument of harassment." 441 U.S. at 102. Their argument was based on Senator Allott's
amendment adding a "bona fide offer" requirement to one part of§ 3604(a). See 114 CONG. REC. 5515
(1968). The Supreme Court found this argument "unconvincing," commenting that "[n]owhere does
the history of the Act suggest that Congress attempted to deter possible harassment by limiting
standing under [§ 3612]." Id at 107. See also Comment, supra note 79, at 572. Indeed, the "bona fide
offer" requirement is notably absent from the other prohibitions of § 3604(a) and, forthat matter, from
all of the other substantive provisions of Title VIII. Senator Allott himself noted that the requirement
applied only to limited sale or rental situations and that "the latter part of paragraph (a) is not
conditioned upon a bona fide offer." 114 CONG. REc. 5515 (1968). Thus, § 3604(a) also prohibits
discriminatory refusals to negotiate and all other practices that "otherwise make unavailable or deny"
housing "to any person because of race," regardless of whether a bona fide offer is at issue. See, e.g.,
Grant v. Smith, 574 F.2d 252, 255 (5th Cir. 1978); Zuch v. Hussey, 394 F. Supp. 1028, 1047-48 (E.D.
Mich. 1975), aff'd, 547 F.2d 1168 (6th Cir. 1976).
300. See text accompanying notes 141-47 supra. But see cases cited in note 146 supra. It is
interesting to note that both City of Hartford and Petaluma, the two principal post- Warth cases that
have denied standing after a trial, were appellate court decisions that reversed trial judges' findings in
favor of the plaintiffs. Id.
301. See note 57 supra.
302. 441 U.S. at 103.
303. See text accompanying notes 221-23, 259-63 supra.
304. 441 U.S. at 103 n.9.
305. Id.
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equate those who are the direct targets of housing discrimination with
those who are considered to be directly injured by that discrimination
turns out to be unimportant under Title VIII.3 °6 The Court in Bellwood
held that anyone who is "genuinely injured by conduct that violates
someone's [§ 3604] rights" may sue under section 3612 to recover for that
injury.30 7 In this respect, it comes closer than any other Supreme Court
decision to stating a broadly applicable rule of standing in fair housing
cases. At least for purposes of Title VIII claims, this general rule is that
standing to sue exists "as long as the plaintiff suffers actual injury as a result
of the defendant's conduct. 30 8 A complete list of what may properly be
claimed as "actual injury" remains for future cases to establish, 0 9 but
Bellwood makes clear that it includes the loss of interracial associations by
local residents whose neighborhood has been the target of illegal racial
steering.
3. Bellwood's Other Plaintiffs: Municipalities,
Fair Housing Organizations, and Testers
Bellwood does go beyond Trafficante in one respect, and that is in its
recognition that a municipality has Title VIII standing to complain that its
housing market is being manipulated on the basis of race .31  This is
significant for at least two reasons. First, it serves to undercut the rather
silly notion suggested in Arlington Heights that a plaintiff's "racial
identity" or lack of "racial identity" may be a basis for denying him
standing. The municipal government of Bellwood, Illinois, had no more
racial identity than did the housing developer in Arlington Heights, but
this did not prevent the Supreme Court from rightfully conferring standing
on the village.31
A second and even more important result of the Court's holding that a
municipality like Bellwood has standing is that some of the burden of
enforcing Title VIII may be lifted from the shoulders of individual
plaintiffs. By its very nature, a Bellwood-type suit is brought on behalf of
the entire community that is affected by the defendants' illegal practices.
The community's corporate representative is the appropriate plaintiff. It
may be asking too much for an individual resident to pursue this kind of
litigation alone. No doubt some instances of steering and other broad-
based types of housing discrimination have gone unchallenged because the
306. See text accompanying notes 223-28, 235-54 supra.
307. 441 U.S. at 103 n.9.
308. Id.
309. Some of the injuries that have already been held sufficient under Title ViII are reviewed in
Part Ii(C) infra.
310. 441 U.S. at 11. See note 278 supra.
311. Title Vill's definition of a "person" who may be injured by a discriminatory housing
practice and who is entitled to sue is extremely broad and includes corporations, associations, and
other entities that would not have a particular racial identity. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(d) (1976). Seenote278
supra.
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persons injured by them were unwilling to become involved in a law suit.
As a result of Bellwood, however, more of these practices should be
challenged, and the adversaries will likely be on a more even basis as far as
litigation resources are concerned. There will still be a role for the injured
homeowner to play, of course, either as co-plaintiff or simply as a citizen
prompting his local government to action.312 And when the individual is
unable to convince his town to bring suit, he still has the option under
Bellwood of bringing suit on his own.
By recognizing Title VIII standing in local municipalities as well as
their residents, Bellwood makes it less important from an enforcement
point of view whether other types of potential plaintiffs are accorded
standing. Claims by two of these other groups-fair housing organizations
and "testers"-were originally made in Bellwood, but they were not
considered by the Supreme Court. The Leadership Council for
Metropolitan Open Communities, a Chicago fair housing organization,
was one of the original plaintiffs. Its claim of interest and involvement in
the Bellwood steering situation was held inadequate by the Seventh
Circuit, and the Council did not seek review of this decision in the Supreme
Court.313  Other lower courts have recognized standing in such
organizations.31 4 Unlike the Leadership Council's claim in Bellvood,
however, these organizations usually have been asserting the rights of their
members. 315 This they may clearly do under Warth so long as the members'
rights are sufficient for standing purposes. 316 In addition, the cases in which
fair housing organizations have been accorded standing generally have
included other appropriate plaintiffs.317 This makes the recognition of the
organization's standing somewhat suspect as a precedent in light of the
Arlington Heights determination that only one proper plaintiff is
necessary.31 8
In the modern era of fair housing litigation, the federal courts have
uniformly accepted and endorsed the use of "testers" to investigate and
prove allegations of housing discrimination. 3 '9 However, they have been a
312. Compare Bellwood with Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 n.18 (1975).
313. 441 U.S. at 98 n.5.
314. See, e.g., Williamsburg Fair Hous. v. New York City Hous. Auth., 450 F. Supp. 602
(S.D.N.Y. 1978); Fair Hous. Council of Bergen County, Inc. v. Eastern Bergen County Multiple
Listing Serv., Inc., 422 F. Supp. 1071, 1083 (D.N.J. 1976), and the cases cited therein. Compare
Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2nd Cir. 1968); Coalition for Block Grant
Compliance v. HUD, 450 F. Supp. 43 (E.D. Mich. 1979). See also Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,261-63 (1977) NAACP v. ITT Community Dev. Corp.,
399 F. Supp. 366 (D.D.C. 1975).
315. See, e.g., Coalition for Block Grant Compliance v. HUD, 450 F. Supp. 43, 52 n.14 (E.D.
Mich. 1979); Fair Hous. Council of Bergen County, Inc. v. Eastern Bergen County Multiple Listing
Serv., Inc., 422 F. Supp. 1071, 1083 (D.N.J. 1976), and the cases cited therein.
316. 422 U.S. at 513. See also cases cited in note 315 supra.
317. See, e.g., cases cited in note 314 supra.
318. 429 U.S. at 263-64. See note 143 and accompanying text supra.
319. See, e.g., Grant v. Smith, 574 F.2d 252, 254 n.3 (5th Cir. 1978), and the cases cited therein;
Smith v. Anchor Bldg. Corp., 536 F. 2d 231, 234 n.2 (8th Cir. 1976). See also Gladstone Realtors v.
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good deal less certain about whether testers who have encountered
discrimination should be given standing to sue. The Supreme Court has
recognized standing on the part of testers in other civil rights contexts,320
and some lower courts have followed this lead in housing discrimination
cases. 321 In Bellwood, the individual plaintiffs had conducted tests of the
defendants' offices prior to filing suit. They initially argued that their status
as testers subjected to discrimination, as well as their position as local
residents, gave them standing. This argument was rejected by the district
court, and the plaintiffs abandoned it in their appeal. The Seventh Circuit,
therefore, did not consider whether "testers qua testers have a cause of
action. 322 It did remark, however, that that part of the plaintiffs'
complaint alleging that they were "denied of their right to select housing
without regard to race" was precluded by the fact that they were not actual
homeseekers.323
In the Supreme Court, the question of the plaintiffs' standing as
testers, like the issue of the Leadership Council's standing, was not
considered.324 Nevertheless, Bellwood casts some doubt on the proposition
that testers should have standing, simply because the principal argument
in favor of it-that tester-plaintiffs are necessary to the full enforcement
of the fair housing laws that Congress intended 32 5-is undercut by the
availability of standing for local residents and municipalities. This is not to
say that testers are not "actually injured" by discrimination directed
against them. Indeed, the black tester who is discriminated against would
seem to have encountered much the same racial insult and humiliation as
326an actual black homeseeker. Nevertheless, to the extent that the tester's
standing claim is based on the need for more "private attorneys general" to
help enforce the fair housing laws,327 that need seems less acute after
Bellwood. With standing to sue now firmly recognized in municipalities
and local residents as well as in the "direct victims" of discrimination and
those who would rent or sell to them, few discriminatory housing practices
Village of Bellwood. 441 U.S. 91,94(1979); United States v. Wisconsin, 395 F. Supp. 732 (W.D. Wis.
1975).
320. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); Evers v. Dwyer, 358 U.S. 202 (1958).
321. E.g., Meyers v. Pennypack Woods Home Ownership Ass'n, 559 F.2d 894,897-98 (3rd Cir.
1977); Wheatley Heights Neighborhood Coalition v. Jenna Resales Co., 429 F. Supp. 486,488 (E.D.
N.Y. 1977). See also Zuch v. Hussey, 394 F. Supp. 1028 (E.D. Mich. 1975), aff'd, 547 F.2d 1168 (6th
Cir. 1976); Bell Realtyand Ins. Agencyv. Chicago Comm'n on Human Relations, 130 111. App. 2d 1072
(1971).
322. Village of Bellwood v. Gladstone Realtors, 569 F.2d 1013, 1016 (7th Cir. 1978).
323. Id.
324. 441 U.S. at I11.
325. See text accompanying notes 95-104 supra.
326. See note 38 and accompanying text supra. Of course, there is this difference: the tester may
be expecting to be discriminated against. Indeed, the purpose of most tests is to find out whether
suspected discrimination is actually occurring. So the tester may be less surprised and upset than the
actual homeseeker when discrimination takes place. This difference, however, would seem to go to the
extent of the injury, not its nature. See generally Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 515-16 (1975).
327. See Traflicante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972).
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should go unchallenged simply because testers or fair housing
organizations are not permitted to sue.
II. SOME CONCLUSIONS AND TYPES OF CASES
The preceding review of the five modern Supreme Court decisions
dealing with standing in fair housing cases leads to a number of
conclusions about the state of the law governing this subject. This section
summarizes these conclusions, first dealing with the ones that might be
termed procedural and then reviewing the more substantive ones. Finally,
the status of various types of potential fair housing claimants is considered
in light of these conclusions.
A. Procedural Matters
The two most obvious procedural issues to emerge from the Supreme
Court's decisions are: (1) the degree of detail a federal housing
discrimination complaint must contain to withstand a motion to dismiss
on article III standing grounds; and (2) the appropriate time for a decision
on the motion to dismiss. Although these matters are far from clear, the
Court has provided some guidance for their resolution, particularly in
Warth and Bellwood.
As a general rule, it appears that factual allegations must be more
detailed as the type of claim asserted by the plaintiff becomes more
complex or at least less traditional. In a "garden variety" fair housing case
like Sullivan, in which a minority homeseeker's attempt to buy or rent a
particular home is refused on the basis of his race, the normal pleading
rules requiring only a short, plain, simple complaint seem to apply. As the
case becomes more complicated, however, the plaintiff may be called upon
to supply, either in his complaint or in other pretrial materials, a
substantially more detailed account of his theory of the defendant's
liability, his own injury, and the causal link between the two.
Generally, the elements on which additional specificity has been
required are the plaintiff's injury and causation rather than the defendant's
liability. In Trafficante and Bellwood, for example, it was clear that the
defendants' differing treatment of whites and blacks violated Title VIII.
The real issue was whether these violations caused any legally cognizable
injury to the particular plaintiffs. Indeed, a number of lower court cases
have held that it is sufficient for a complaint to put the defendant's
violation in terms of conclusory allegations that simply track the language
of Title VIII.328 With respect to the elements of the plaintiff's injury and
causation, however, Warth and Bellwood indicate that the plaintiff will
have to provide a degree of specificity well beyond that normally required
328. See, e.g., United States v. Metro Dev. Corp., 61 F.R.D. 83 (N.D. Ga. 1973); United States v.
Northside Realty Assocs., 324 F. Supp. 287, 289-90 (N.D. Ga. 1971); United States v. Bob Lawrence
Realty, Inc., 313 F. Supp. 870, 872-73 (N.D. Ga. 1970), aff'd, 474 F.2d 115 (5th Cir. 1973).
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by the federal rules, at least in exclusionary zoning, steering, and other
types of cases that relate to community-wide injuries. 29
The Court has never explained why a different standard of fact
pleading may apply to these more complicated cases, but their very
complexity may be reason enough. As long as the judiciary lacks
experience in hearing these new types of claims and in understanding what
injuries may be entailed and how they are caused, enough uncertainty
exists to make it desirable for the plaintiff to spell out his theories on these
points at a preliminary stage. Once these uncertainties are resolved, a
return to the more traditional requirements of simple notice pleading
would be in order. These uncertainties could be resolved either through a
determination that Congress has recognized injury in a particular group,
like the Trafficante plaintiffs, or because the Court has identified a
particular fact, such as a specific housing project in exclusionary zoning
cases, that is made the key to causation and injury.
Warth's requirement of a specific housing project also serves as a
reminder that detailed pleading, even if the plaintiff is willing to provide it,
is not the answer to all standing problems. Once the necessary substantive
elements of standing in a particular type of claim are established, the
plaintiff must allege them, and his failure to do so will not be excused no
matter how long or specific his complaint is.
The Supreme Court has given conflicting signals concerning when the
standing issue should be addressed. In Warth, standing was viewed as a
"threshold question" to be decided on the basis of a pretrial motion to
dismiss. However, in Bellwood the Court directed that many of the factual
issues on which standing turned were to be resolved only after the evidence
was presented at trial. One explanation for this difference may be that the
Court is more willing to defer the standing decision in a Title VIII case
because Congress has presumably lent some credence to the plaintiff's
injury and causation theories. Another distinction between the two cases is
that the Warth plaintiffs failed to allege what the Court believed to be a
necessary fact (the existence of a current project), whereas the Bellwood
allegations were complete as far as the substantive requirements of
standing were concerned. In circumstances like those of Bellwood, then,
article III standing is still a "threshold" matter, but only in that standing
must be found before a decision on the merits is rendered, not that it is a
prerequisite to having a trial in the first place.
Ordinarily, the defendant would be expected to raise the standing
issue at an early stage of the proceedings, not only because he might
succeed in having the case dismissed, but also to use the issue as a
discovery device, or for other purely strategic reasons. 330 The Supreme
329. See, e.g., Fair Hous. Council of Bergen County, Inc. v. Eastern Bergen County Multiple
Listing Serv., Inc., 422 F. Supp. 1071, 1074 (D.N.J. 1976) ("voluminous" complaintupheld insteering
case).
330. See note 174 supra. But see note 331 infra.
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Court's decision to stress standing problems in housing discrimination
cases unfortunately has encouraged defendants to regularly challenge
standing in all but the simplest of fair housing cases. Certainly, decisions
like Warth tend to reinforce this behavior.331 If Title VIII defendants
persist in raising the standing issue as a preliminary matter, however,
Bellwood provides trial courts with substantial flexibility in deferring a
decision on this issue until after trial.
It may be tempting from the point of view of conserving judicial
resources and the parties' time to decide the standing question at an early
stage. However, as Trafficante and Bellwood demonstrate, this procedure
may turn out to be more wasteful in the long run. It would require
preliminary factual presentations and court decisions in numerous cases
that might be settled or otherwise resolved prior to trial were the standing
decision deferred. At least in Title VIII cases, in which there is no clear gap
in the necessary allegations, the better practice would be to reserve the
question until after the evidence has been presented. After trial, of course,
the court may well decide to resolve the case on the merits rather than on
standing grounds, which generally is preferable in any event.
Deferring would be particularly appropriate in cases brought under
Title VIII and section 1982. The Supreme Court's approach in Trafficante
and Bellwood will no doubt encourage lower courts to ignore the section
1982 claim once Title VIII standing is recognized, even though it may be
necessary to rule on section 1982 because the relief available under it is
broader than the relief authorized by Title VIII.332 Because the question of
proper relief would not become relevant until after the defendant's liability
is established at trial, courts that defer the standing question until this time
would reap the added benefit of only having to decide section 1982 issues
that are necessarily presented.
A final note on timing has to do with waiver. Whether a challenge to
the plaintiff's standing may be made for the first time after the trial court's
judgment is rendered depends on whether article III standing is an issue. If
it is, the matter is considered jurisdictional, and it may be initially raised at
any time, even during an appeal.333 If the problem is one of statutory
standing or prudential considerations, however, it will be ignored unless
the defendant objects in a timely fashion.334 In state court, in which article
III does not apply, all standing issues under Title VIII and section 1982 are
waivable.
331. It is worth noting, however, that the motion to dismiss for lack of standing may not always
work to the defendant's advantage. For example, had the defendants in Trafficante simply permitted
that novel claim to proceed to a trial on the merits, it is hard to imagine that they would have been held
liable for anything near the amount they ultimately spent in litigation costs and in settling the case after
the Supreme Court ruled against them. This is particularly true in a field like fair housing, in which a
losing defendant may be liable for the plaintiff's attorney's fees. See note 76 supra.
332. See notes 76, 118 supra.
333. See note 53 supra.
334. See notes 53, 142, 278 supra.
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In addition to matters of pleading and timing, two other procedural
points about standing emerge from the Supreme Court's fair housing
decisions. First, Arlington Heights indicated that only one plaintiff with
standing is required for a case to be decided on the merits. Additional
parties, whose standing may otherwise be questionable, may join as co-
plaintiffs, at least if they satisfy the requirements of article III. This rule
may not appreciably increase the number of potential plaintiffs having
standing in cases brought under Title VIII, which extends to the limits of
article III anyway, but it may encourage more multiple-party suits,
particularly those in which fair housing and residential organizations join
to support the efforts of the individual plaintiffs.
Second, the Court's decisions show that the number of potential
plaintiffs having standing is generally not expanded by either a class action
claim or a demand for money damages. Even though the claims asserted in
Trafficante, Warth, Arlington Heights, and Bellwood were class-wide, the
Court invariably focused on the individual plaintiffs. Plaintiffs' arguments
for standing were not enhanced by the fact that they may have also sought
to represent a class of similarly-situated complainants. Indeed, only Warth
reached the Supreme Court as a class action, and it was the only case in
which standing was denied.
Similarly, the Court has all but ignored the fact that the plaintiffs in
these cases sought money damages as well as equitable relief. Arguably, a
damage claim should make a difference. In Warth, for example, the Court
held that judicial relief would not remove the harm complained of because
no housing project was currently being considered. However, this holding
assumed that only prospective injunctive relief was available. If the
plaintiffs' injury were viewed as including past exclusion from Penfield,
judicial relief in the form of a money judgment could certainly compensate
for this injury. As a matter of fact, the Warth plaintiffs did include a large
claim for money damages in their complaint, as did the plaintiffs in
Arlington Heights and Bellwood, but the Supreme Court did not discuss
these claims separately nor were they seen as advancing the plaintiffs'
standing in any way. Indeed, in Warth, the builders' associations were
specifically held not to have standing to seek damages on behalf of their
members. Only in Sullivan did the Court find the damage claim to be
significant, because the black homeseeker's move there prevented him
from seeking injunctive relief and meant that only money damages were
available to him. Thus, in a simple case like Sullivan, in which the standing
issue is what relief the plaintiff is entitled to, damage claims and perhaps
class actions may be important.335 However, they will not help to meet the
article III requirements and are not at all relevant in cases concerning
standing to challenge community-wide housing discrimination.
335. See, e.g., Gore v. Turner, 563 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. 1977); Weathers v. Peters Realty Corp., 499
F.2d 1197 (6th Cir. 1974). See also County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625 (1979).
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B. Substantive Standing Law in Fair Housing Cases
Perhaps the most important lesson to be derived from the Supreme
Court's decisions is that standing to sue in fair housing cases depends to a
great extent on the substantive law under which the claim is brought. There
are four possible bases for a fair housing claim, each with its own standard
for determining standing: (1) equal protection or other constitutional
claims, for which standing is the most limited; (2) section 1982 claims,
which seem to be subject to some of the same prudential limitations that
apply to the constitutional provisions, but which may enjoy broader
standing in some contexts; (3) claims brought under the Fair Housing Act,
which defines standing as broadly as is permitted under article III; and (4)
Administrative Procedure Act claims against HUD and other agencies for
violations of Title VIII or other fair housing laws brought by plaintiffs who
need only be "arguably within the zone of interests" of those provisions, a
test that on its face is even broader than the substantive statute relied on.
The most restrictive of these standards is the least important, because
the equal protection clause is no longer the principal weapon used to attack
housing discrimination by state and local governments. Exclusionary land
use decisions and most other forms of governmental discrimination
subject to an equal protection challenge are also prohibited by Title VIII.
Because Title VIII does not require the proof of discriminatory purpose
that is necessary to make out an equal protection violation, these suits are
now generally brought as statutory rather than constitutional claims. In
these statutory cases, the plaintiffs' standing will be judged by the more
generous Title VIII standard.
In the precise Warth situation-an exclusionary zoning ordinance
challenged in the absence of a specific project-it is still an open question
whether the plaintiffs would have standing if they brought their claim
under Title VIII. 336 The presence of the statute should at least reduce
Warth's concern that the judiciary would be improperly meddling in local
affairs. If Warth does survive to block this type of claim under Title VIII,
the result would be to channel attacks on certain types of exclusionary
schemes to state rather than federal court. Such a result seems particularly
ludicrous when the basis for the claim is a federal statute that specifically
authorizes suit in both federal and state courts. 337 In any event, in Warth-
type complaints and other suits challenging public discrimination,
plaintiffs are now likely to place principal reliance on Title VIII rather than
the equal protection clause, and their standing will therefore bejudged by a
more lenient standard.
Standing under section 1982 and Title VIII are to be determined as
matters of statutory construction. The same is true for the Administrative
336. See text accompanying notes 235-54 supra. See, e.g., Planning for People Coalition v.
County of DuPage, 70 F.R.D. 38 (N.D. Il1. 1976).
337. See 42 U.S.C. § 3612 (1976). See also 42 U.S.C. § 3610 (1976).
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Procedure Act "zone of interest" cases that are based on these statutes.
This is not to say that standing under these laws is to bejudged by the same
test-clearly it is not-but only that the proper way to decide therstanding
question in all these cases is by means of construing the particular statute
involved. This process essentially seeks to determine whether Congress
intended for a person in the plaintiff's position to have a cause of action
for the injuries he has suffered as a result of the defendant's behavior. This
is the way the Court has analyzed the Title VIII claims in Trafficante and
Bellwood and the way it has characterized Sullivan, its principal section
1982 decision.33 8 A basic conclusion of this article, therefore, is that
according a plaintiff standing to bring a particular claim under one of the
fair housing statutes is precisely the same as concluding that he has stated a
claim on the merits. Both require that the relevant statute be construed to
protect the plaintiff from the harm allegedly caused by the defendant's
conduct. One exception is that, in an APA case, the standing test would
actually be easier to meet than stating a claim, since standing is recognized
if the claim is even "arguably" within the statute.
Of course, if the case is brought in federal court, the article III
requirements must also be met. Thus far, however, no decision has
recognized standing under section 1982 or Title VIII and then held that
such a congressionally-authorized claim failed to satisfy article III.139 It
seems unlikely that such a case would arise. The opinions in Trafficante,
Warth, and Bellwood all recognized broad authority in Congress to create
"judicially cognizable injuries" by statute. Moreover, particularly in the
civil rights field, the Court has shown great deference to the congressional
power to determine when an injury has occurred and what caused it.340
If a good statutory claim were held inadequate under article III, the
plaintiff might then take his case to a state court. The state court would
then be called upon to render a decision based on a federal statute that
could not be reviewed by the United States Supreme Court, hardly a happy
prospect for the sensible and uniform administration of the federal fair
housing laws. This should not be permitted to happen. Because standing
under Title VIII is as broad as article III permits and section 1982 standing
is no broader, all challenges to a plaintiff's standing in Title VIII or section
1982 cases should be resolved by resort to the relevant statute: If Congress
intended that this plaintiff have standing, article III should be satisfied; if
not, the article III question would not arise.
Treating standing in such cases purely as a matter of statutory
construction without additional article III limitations would mean that
Supreme Court review would always be available, even if the case began in
338. See note 55 supra.
339. But see Evans v. Lynn, 537 F.2d 589 (2nd Cir. 1975) (en bane), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1066
(1977). See also City of Hartford v. Town of Glastonbury, 561 F.2d 1048 (2nd Cir. 1977) (en bane), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1978).
340. See text accompanying notes 245-54 supra.
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state court. The Court would thus remain the final authority on the
meaning of the federal fair housing statutes, which of course it should be.
In addition, freeing these determinations from article III overtones would
confirm the notion that they are not simply jurisdictional questions, but
are decisions on the merits and thus are entitled to appropriate resjudicata
effect. This would avoid the wasteful and unfair result of a defendant's
prevailing on the standing issue after a full trial in federal court only to
have the plaintiff start the case over again in state court.
What remains, then, is to determine who has statutory standing under
section 1982 and Title VIII. With respect to the Fair Housing Act, the
Supreme Court has held that both of its private enforcement sections
reflect a congressional intention to define standing as broadly as article III
would permit. This means that there are no prudential limitations on
standing in suits brought under the Act and thus no prohibition against a
plaintiff asserting the rights of others who are the "direct targets" of a Title
VIII violation. Indeed, the labels "direct target," "direct victim," "direct
injury," and the like appear to have no significance whatsoever in a Title
VIII case. According to Bellwood, anyone may sue who is "genuinely
injured by conduct that violates someone's rights"'34' under Title VIII.
Standing exists "as long as the plaintiff suffers actual injury as a result of
the defendant's conduct.
3 42
Thus, after Bellwood, the problem of whether a plaintiff has standing
to assert a Title VIII claim depends on the answers to two questions: (1) has
the defendant violated Title VIII? and (2) has this violation caused the
plaintiff "actual injury"? The first question should be easy enough to
answer, at least at the pleading stage. The complaint need only allege that
defendant has violated one of the substantive provisions of the Fair
Housing Act, which prohibit discriminatory refusals to rent, sell, and
negotiate, discriminatory services and facilities, discriminatory notices
and advertising, misrepresentations concerning availability, blockbusting,
discriminatory financing and brokerage services, interference with those
who have helped homeseekers protected by the Act, and any activity that
would "otherwise make unavailable or deny" housing on racial grounds.
343
These prohibitions have been held to outlaw racial steering,344 redlining,3 5
and exclusionary zoning.346 Indeed, a number of lower courts have
341. 441 U.S. at 103 n.9.
342. Id.
343. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-3606, 3617 (1976).
344. See cases cited at 441 U.S. 115 n.32.
345. See, e.g., Dunn v. Midwestern Indem., 472 F. Supp. 1108 (S.D. Ohio 1979); Harrison v.
Otto G. Heinzeroth Mortgage Co., 414 F. Supp. 66 (N.D. Ohio 1976) and 430 F. Supp. 893 (N.D. Ohio
1977); Laufman v. Oakley Bldg. & Loan Co., 408 F. Supp. 489 (S.D. Ohio 1976).
346. See, e.g., Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126 (3rd Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 908 (1978); Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283 (7th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 34 U.S. 1025 (1978).
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remarked that the language of Title VIII's substantive prohibitions is "as
broad as Congress could have made it.
3 4 7
The second element-whether the plaintiff has been "genuinely
injured" or has suffered "actual injury" as a result of the defendant's
violation-is somewhat more complicated. Title VIII does not spell out
what types of injuries may result when one of the discriminatory housing
practices it condemns occurs. Therefore, it is up to the courts to decide
which actual injuries Congress intended to protect against. Certainly, one
such injury is financial damage. This may occur when a minority applicant
fails to obtain the home he has chosen; or when a home supplier like
Sullivan or MHDC is prevented from concluding a deal with minority
homeseekers; or when a resident whose neighborhood is subjected to
steering or blockbusting finds his home devalued; or when a broker with a
minority client loses a commission;341 or in a variety of other ways. Of
course, injuries covered by Title VIII are not limited to economic losses.
There is also the racial insult and humiliation to which a minority
homeseeker is exposed when he is discriminated against. 49 Another
noneconomic injury is the loss of interracial associations that the Court in
Trafficante and Bellwood recognized in residents of an apartment complex
or neighborhood whose racial make-up is being manipulated. Even an
interest in fair housing may be sufficient if it is coupled with involvement in
a particular housing development or similar commitment, as it was for
MHDC in Arlington Heights. An exhaustive list of "actual injuries"
covered by Title VIII is yet to be written by the courts, but it is clear that the
list will be a long one. And anyone-person, village, corporation, or other
entity-who suffers one of these injuries as a result of the defendant's
violation of the Fair Housing Act has standing to sue.
Standing under section 1982 is not the same as Title VIII standing.
Even though both are to be determined as matters of statutory
construction and even though the Supreme Court has indicated that
section 1982 is to be broadly construed,350 Warth strongly suggests that the
Court is not about to interpret section 1982 standing as broadly as it has
standing under Title VIII.
The substantive provisions of the two statutes are not the same. The
fact that the Fair Housing Act prohibits a number of discriminatory
housing practices that section 1982 does not cover has led the Court to
remark that, unlike Title VIII, "§ 1982 is not a comprehensive open housing
347. See, e.g., United States v. Youritan Constr. Co. 370 F. Supp. 643, 648 (N.D. Cal. 1973),
aft'd as modfied, 509 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1975); Zuch v. Hussey, 366 F. Supp. 553, 557 (E.D. Mich.
1973), affld, 547 F.2d 1168 (6th Cir. 1977).
348. See, e.g., Crumble v. Blumthal, 549 F.2d 462 (7th Cir. 1977); Williams v. Miller, 460 F.
Supp. 761 (N.D. I1. 1978).
349. See note 38 and accompanying text supra.
350. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 238 (1969).
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law.""' 1 In addition, Title VIII protection extends to "persons," natural
and otherwise, while section 1982 speaks in terms of the rights of "citizens."
On the other hand, there are some respects in which section 1982 is the
broader statute: it covers all types of real and personal property, not just
housing, and its guarantees specifically extend to inheriting and holding
this property, as well as to purchasing, leasing, selling, and conveying it.
Thus, because statutory standing is wrapped up with the merits of a claim
and requires a determination of whether the defendant's conduct is
prohibited by the statute, it is apparent that section 1982 and Title VIII do
not necessarily cover the same claims.
Besides the substantive differences in the two statutes, the Supreme
Court has given additional reason to believe that section 1982 standing is
narrower than standing under the Fair Housing Act. Once it is determined
that the defendant has violated someone's rights under Title VIII, anyone
actually injured thereby may sue. However, not everyone who might be
injured by a section 1982 violation has standing to sue. Indeed, the Court in
Warth contended that section 1982 actions are generally subject to the
prudential rule against asserting the rights of minorities protected by the
statute, and it rejected a section 1982 claim by local residents whose
complaint was that they had suffered injury as a result of the defendants'
discrimination against others. The Court in Warth suggested that standing
to assert this Trafficante-type claim might be appropriate under Title VIII,
but it was not under section 1982.352
It is hard to know how far section 1982 standing does extend.
Certainly, the injuries suffered by an individual minority homeseeker who
is discriminated against are covered, although Warth indicated that the
case may have to focus on a particular housing unit or development, not on
a general discriminatory scheme.353 In addition, in Sullivan the Court held
that a housing supplier who is ready and willing to sell or rent to a black
may sue under section 1982 if the defendant interferes with the transaction
on racial grounds. The standing of the housing supplier was categorized in
Warth as a necessary exception to the prudential rule against raising
another's interests. However, it is clear from Sullivan that the supplier's
suit under section 1982 is not dependent on the inability of the black
homeseeker to assert his own rights.
It is difficult to say who, if anyone, beyond the minority homeseeker
and his supplier may have standing under section 1982. In Warth, the
Court suggested that a contractual or other relationship protected by
section 1982 must exist between a black homeseeker who has been
discriminated against and any other party, for the other party to have
351. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968). See also Gladstone Realtors v.
Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 128 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
352. But see Broadmoor Improvement Ass'n v. Stan Weber & Assocs., 597 F.2d 568 (5th Cir.
1979).
353. See also Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948).
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standing to sue under section 1982. 354 Some lower courts have gone a good
deal farther than this by recognizing section 1982 standing in testers and
other plaintiffs even though they have no property-based relationship with
an actual minority homeseeker who has been the direct target of
discrimination.355 Other decisions, however, have adopted the more
restrictive "direct injury" approach.356 It remains to be seen which view the
Supreme Court will endorse as properly reflecting the congressional intent
underlying section 1982.
C. The Types of Plaintiffs Who May Bring Fair Housing Cases
By way of concluding this article, a list of the various categories of
plaintiffs found in fair housing cases is presented below, with an indication
regarding whether that category of plaintiff has standing. It is assumed that
the indicated claims are brought under Title VIII because Title VIII is the
most expansive prohibition of discriminatory housing practices available
and because standing to sue under Title VIII is so broad.
1. Minority Homeseekers Who Are Discriminated Against
There can be no question that these persons have standing under Title
VIII, as they also do under section 1982. The only possible limitation on
their standing is suggested by Warth's requirement that the focus of the suit
must be on a specific housing unit or development. It is unresolved whether
this requirement extends to Title VIII claims.
2. Family Members and Others Living
With Minority Homeseekers
Interracial couples, white parents who have adopted minority
children, and others who live with minorities may be denied housing
because of the race of one family member. Since the entire family unit is
injured by being deprived of the housing desired, courts have recognized
that all members of the family have standing to sue.357
3. Other "Direct Targets" of Title VIIrs
Substantive Prohibitions
Since a variety of discriminatory practices are outlawed by Title VIII,
many different types of "direct targets" are possible. It is worth noting that
354. 422 U.S. at 514 n.22.
355. See, e.g., Meyers v. Pennypack Woods Home Ownership Ass'n, 559 F.2d 894 (3rd Cir.
1977); Miller v. Poretsky, 409 F. Supp. 837 (D.D.C. 1976); Walkerv. Pointer, 304 F. Supp. 56 (N.D.
Tex. 1969). See also Broadmoor Improvement Ass'n v. Stan Weber & Assocs., 597 F.2d 568 (5th Cir.
1979).
356. See, e.g., Kreiger v. Merifield Acres, Inc., 465 F. Supp. 62 (E.D. Va. 1979); United States
Gen., Inc. v. City of Joliet, 432 F. Supp. 346 (N.D. Ill. 1977), aff'd, 598 F.2d 1050 (7th Cir. 1979). See
also Traflicante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 446 F.2d 1158, 1164 (9th Cir. 1971), rev'd on other
grounds, 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
357. See, e.g., Pughsley v. 3750 Lake Shore Drive Coop. Bldg., 463 F.2d 1055 (7th Cir. 1972);
Lamb v. Sallee, 417 F. Supp. 282 (E.D. Ky. 1976).
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people of all races may be victimized by blockbusting, redlining,
discriminatory advertising, and other practices prohibited by Title VIII.358
All "direct targets" have standing to complain of the unlawful practices
that injure them.
4. "Direct Targets" of Interference
or Coercion Under Section 3617
Title VIII makes it unlawful "to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or
interfere with any person . . . on account of his having aided or
encouraged" someone exercising his Title VIII rights. 3 9 "Direct targets"
who have standing to sue under section 3617 include real estate agents and
apartment managers who are injured as a result of their trying to close a
deal with a minority homeseeker 360 and testers who are sued for having
investigated housing discrimination complaints. 36' This provision might
also be read to include other types of plaintiffs, such as fair housing
organizations and housing suppliers,362 but their claims will be dealt with
separately.
5. Housing Suppliers Whose Efforts to Sell
or Rent to Blacks Are Interfered With
A builder as large as MHDC or an individual tenant who is trying to
sublease his apartment to a minority has standing to sue. The Court in
Sullivan held that any racial limitation on a supplier's right to sell or rent
gives rise to a section 1982 claim. The same would be true for any "actual
injury" a supplier might suffer under Title VIII. However, Warth may
require that a specific development or unit be involved instead of just a
general plan, although even this limitation may not apply to standing
under Title VIII.
6. Local Residents Whose Area is Being Racially Manipulated
Both apartment dwellers and neighborhood residents have standing
to sue. The Court's opinion in Bellwoodeven holds out the hope that those
outside the area may have standing if they too are injured. This "right to
live in an integrated community" claim may arise in a variety of situations,
as Trafficante and Bellwood demonstrate. The Trafficante-type complaint
is made by residents of an area that is being kept all white by the
defendant's discrimination against minority homeseekers. The Bellwood-
358. See, e.g., Mayers v. Ridley, 465 F.2d 630 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en bane); Harrison v. Otto G.
Heinzeroth Mortgage Co., 414 F. Supp. 66 (N.D. Ohio 1976); Sanborn v. Wagner, 354 F. Supp. 291
(D. Md. 1973); Brown v. State Realty Co. 304 F. Supp. 1236 (N.D. Ga. 1969).
359. 42 U.S.C. § 3617 (1976).
360. See, e.g., Crumble v. Blumthal, 549 F.2d 462 (7th Cir. 1977); Smith v. Stechel, 510 F.2d
1162 (9th Cir. 1975).
361. See Northside Realty Assocs., v. Chapman, 411 F. Supp. 1195 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
362. See, e.g., Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283,
1288 & n.5 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978); United States General, Inc. v. City of
Joliet, 432 F. Supp. 346 (N.D. Ill. 1977), aff'd, 598 F.2d 1050 (7th Cir. 1979).
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type claim arises when an already integrated neighborhood is threatened
with resegregation by the defendant's steering, blockbusting, or other
unlawful conduct. Most Bellwood-type claims allege that the defendant's
practices are turning the neighborhood black, although occasionally the
defendant will be accused of removing the blacks from the area and
creating an all-white neighborhood.363
A variation on the Trafficante-Bellwood theme is presented by a claim
that HUD's involvement with a subsidized housing project will increase
the racial concentration of the area and thereby violate HUD's affimative
duty to foster integration under Title VIII. 364 Another variation is the
complaint of public housing residents that the housing authority's tenant
assignment and site selection policies concentrate racial minorities in
certain areas.16' These claims are essentially the same. The plaintiffs are
asserting their right to live in an integrated community and to protect their
home and business investments from the dangers associated with a racially
concentrated area. They have standing to do So.
3 66
7. Former Residents and Others Currently
Living Outside the Injured Area
A number of cases challenging urban renewal policies that remove
blacks from what had been integrated areas have recognized standing in
the displaced former residents.3 67 These plaintiffs may be viewed as the
"direct targets" of the policies being challenged. Moreover, their interest in
the integrated nature of their former neighborhood also serves as a
reminder that Bellwood left open the possibility that outsiders may have
standing to attack the racial manipulation of a neighborhood if it results in
injury to their financial interests or to the integrated character of their own
area.3 68 In other contexts, however, some courts have held that segregation
in one area is not subject to attack by those in a neighboring community,
because of the lack of a sufficient causal connection between the plaintiffs'
injuries and the complained of segregation.3 69
363. See, e.g., Fox v. HUD, 416 F. Supp. 954 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Marin City Coancil v. Marin
County Redev. Agency, 416 F. Supp. 700 (N.D. Cal. 1975). These cases were cited with approval in
Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 114 n.28 (1979).
364. 42 U.S.C. § 3608(e)(5) (1976). See, e.g., Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809 (3rd Cir. 1970); and
cases cited in note 362 supra. See also note 78 supra.
365. See, e.g., Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976).
366. The recognition in Belivood of the threat to local residents' investments from steering or
other forms of discrimination in their area suggests that local businesses would also have standing to
challenge such discrimination. See Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809 (3rd Cir. 1970); and note 78 supra.
One commentator has even argued that realtors should havestandingunderTitle VIII to challenge the
discriminatory practices of their competitors. Comment, supra note 79, at 570 ("Compliant
businessmen are certainly more exposed to economic pressure from the consumer market if
recalcitrant businessmen are permitted to compete uncontrolled in the same consumer market.").
367. See, e.g., Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2nd Cir. 1968); Fox v.
H UD. 416 F. Supp. 954 (E.D. Pa. 1976); 468 F. Supp. 907 (E.D. Pa. 1979). See also Otero v. New York
City Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122 (2nd Cir. 1973).
368. Broadmoor Improvement Ass'nv. Stan Weber& Assocs., 597 F.2d 568,570 (5th Cir. 1979).
369. See, e.g., City of Hartford v. Town of Glastonbury, 561 F.2d 1048 (2nd Cir. 1977) (en banc),
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8. Municipalities Whose Housing Stock
is Being Racially Manipulated
In Bellwood the Supreme Court recognized Title VIII standing in a
municipality to sue whenever the defendant's steering, blockbusting, or
other discriminatory practices begin to rob the town of its integrated
character. Presumably, local governments could also bring Trafficante-
type claims if blacks were being steered away from what is virtually an all-
white area. What other municipal plaintiffs will be found to have standing
remains to be seen.370 One possibility suggested by the Bellwood opinion's
recognition that school segregation may be linked to housing discrimina-
tion3 71 is that local school boards faced with having to implement
desegregation plans might sue realtors and other defendants who have
limited or destroyed integrated housing patterns in their area.372 Another
possibility is that local residents might sue their town if it fails to assert its
Bellwood-Trafficante rights in court. However, standing seems doubtful
here in view of the tenuous connection between the plaintiffs' injury and
the town's lack of action,373 even if that inaction could be considered
unlawful. In addition, because Bellwood permits these plaintiffs to sue
directly those who are responsible for the racial manipulation of their area,
a suit against their town would seem to be an unnecessary diversion.
9. Organizations
In Warth the Court recognized that injunctive suits by organizations
are proper if any of their members would have standing to sue individually.
Thus, fair housing organizations, residential groups, and other
associations have often joined their members as co-plaintiffs in housing
discrimination suits in order to relieve the individuals of the sole
responsibility of prosecuting the action. Even though their standing is
"derivative," organizational plaintiffs are often the most effective
adversary of the defendant's practices, and it makes sense to have them as
parties.
The difficult question is whether an organization has standing on its
own simply because it is strongly interested in fair housing. The answer to
this question is probably "No" in light of Sierra Club v. Morton.37 4
However, MHDC's interest in providing low income housing was held to
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1978); Evans v. Lynn, 537 F.2d 589 (2nd Cir. 1976) (en banc), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1066 (1977). But see Coalition for Block Grant Compliance v. HUD, 450 F. Supp. 43 (E.D.
Mich. 1978).
370. See City of Hartford v. Town of Glastonbury, 561 F.2d 1048 (2nd Cir. 1977) (en banc), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1978); and note 283 supra. See also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,508-10 (1975).
371. 441 U.S. at 109-11 & n.24.
372. See Comment, supra note 79, at 571.
373. See generally Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Linda R. S. v.
Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973). See also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508-10 (1975).
374. 405 U.S. 727 (1972). See also Village of Bellwood v. Gladstone Realtors, 569 F.2d 1013,
1017 (7th Cir. 1978), aff'd, 441 U.S. 91 (1979).
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satisfy the article III test in Arlington Heights when this interest was
coupled with a commitment to a specific project.
10. Testers Who Encounter Discrimination
A number of lower courts have held that testers who are discriminated
against in the course of their investigations have standing to challenge that
discrimination. This issue, however, has not been definitely resolved by
any means. The plaintiff-testers in these cases also asserted other
injuries.375 Moreover, the decisions generally focused on the fact that the
defendant violated Title VIII without giving any explanation of how this
violation "actually injured" the testers qua testers. It might be argued that
an injury based on racial humiliation and insult should be recognized in a
black tester who is discriminated against, although the result of giving
black testers standing and denying it to white testers seems unsatisfactory.
Furthermore, the force of what has been the tester's main argument for
standing-that Congress intended a wide range of "private attorneys
general" to be able to sue to ensure adequate enforcement of the Fair
Housing Act-is now substantially undercut by the fact that the Supreme
Court has recognized standing in so many other types of Title VIII
plaintiffs, as this list demonstrates.
375. See, e.g., Meyers v. Pennypack Woods Home Ownership Ass'n, 559 F.2d 894 (3rd Cir.
1977); Wheatley Heights Neighborhood Coalition v. Jenna Resales, 429 F. Supp. 486 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
See also Zuch v. Hussey, 394 F. Supp. 1028 (E.D. Mich. 1975), aff'd, 547 F.2d 1168 (6th Cir. 1976).
1980]

